This Day in Legal History: The End of Roosevelt’s Hundred Days

On this day in 1933, Franklin Roosevelt signed three pieces of legislation that closed out what the country has been calling the Hundred Days ever since: the Banking Act of 1933, the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the Farm Credit Act, with the Home Owners’ Loan Act having been signed three days earlier. The Banking Act of 1933 is the one most lawyers know, because the popular name attached to it — Glass-Steagall — has been doing rhetorical work in financial-regulation debates for ninety-three years.

Carter Glass of Virginia and Henry Steagall of Alabama, the Senate Banking chair and the House Banking chair respectively, built the statute around two structural propositions: that commercial banks should be separated from investment banking and the speculative securities business that had helped pull the country into the Great Depression, and that depositors at member banks should be protected by a federal deposit insurance scheme so that a panic at one bank did not become a panic everywhere.

The deposit insurance piece became the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The separation piece was the part that got partially repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 and then revisited in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The National Industrial Recovery Act, signed the same day, set up the National Recovery Administration and the Public Works Administration and was meant to coordinate industry-wide codes of fair competition; the Supreme Court struck the centerpiece codes provision down two years later in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States in 1935 on nondelegation and Commerce Clause grounds, an opinion that nearly killed the early New Deal and prompted Roosevelt’s court-packing plan two years after that. The Farm Credit Act consolidated and refinanced the agricultural lending system that the Great Depression had taken to the brink.

The legal point worth remembering is that this last day of the Hundred Days was, in retrospect, the moment the federal regulatory state of the twentieth century stopped being a collection of post-Civil-War commissions and started being the integrated structure of agencies, deposit-insurance funds, securities oversight, labor regulation, and welfare administration that the country has lived inside ever since. The fact that the Schechter Court was waiting in the wings to strike down the most ambitious piece of that day’s work is part of the lesson. The constitutional question of how much economic ordering a Congress and a President can do at once was not answered on June 16, 1933 — it was framed.

The Supreme Court on Monday declined to take up E.D. v. Noblesville School District, a free-speech challenge brought by the parents of an Indiana high-school student whose school district had refused to let her post flyers for her student-run anti-abortion club on classroom and hallway walls. The student, identified in court papers by initials because she was a minor when the case was filed, had been the founder of Noblesville High School’s Students for Life chapter. The flyers she wanted posted featured images of demonstrators holding “Defund Planned Parenthood” signs. Noblesville Schools removed the flyers under a district policy giving administrators content-based authority over student materials displayed on school property, and the parents sued under the First Amendment.

The Southern District of Indiana sided with the district in 2024, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2025, both applying Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 1988 case that lets public schools regulate the content of school-sponsored expressive activities if the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. The cert denial leaves Hazelwood intact in the Seventh Circuit and everywhere else.

The piece worth flagging is Justice Alito’s dissent from denial, joined by Justice Thomas, which urged the Court to grant review and use the case to revisit Hazelwood’s framework. The dissent argues that Hazelwood was wrongly decided to the extent that it lets schools draw viewpoint-based lines under the cover of pedagogical-concern review, and that the doctrinal distinction Hazelwood draws between school-sponsored speech and Tinker-style independent student speech has become unworkable in the age of student clubs, distributed school messaging, and post-Mahanoy off-campus speech. Two votes are not five votes. But two votes naming a case as the vehicle they wanted are how the next decade of student-speech cases gets queued up. The Court has now told litigants what kind of vehicle it might be looking for. Expect a steady drumbeat of cert petitions teeing up the Hazelwood revisit over the next several terms.

US Supreme Court turns away free speech claim by anti-abortion student | Reuters via Maryland Daily Record

The Supreme Court also turned away on Monday the National Shooting Sports Foundation’s challenge to New York’s General Business Law § 898, the public-nuisance statute the New York legislature passed in 2021 to let the state and certain private plaintiffs sue firearms manufacturers, distributors, and dealers for endangering the public through the marketing and distribution of their products.

The challenge was supported by Smith & Wesson, Sturm, Ruger, Beretta, Glock, and Sig Sauer, and went up on appeal from a 2024 Second Circuit decision that held the New York statute is not preempted by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, the 2005 federal statute that broadly immunizes the gun industry from civil liability arising from the criminal misuse of firearms.

The Second Circuit reasoned that the PLCAA’s “predicate exception” — which preserves state-law claims when the firearms industry has violated a state or federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms — covers a state public-nuisance statute that, by its terms, regulates the sale and marketing of firearms. The cert denial leaves the Second Circuit’s reading in place, leaves New York’s statute on the books and enforceable, and leaves the industry with a litigation exposure it had hoped to neutralize.

The strategic part of the case is going to be the copycat statutes. California, New Jersey, Washington, Delaware, Illinois, and Hawaii have all enacted versions of the New York approach since 2021, and other states have similar bills in committee. Each of those statutes is going to invite its own PLCAA-preemption fight in its own circuit, and the cumulative jurisprudence is going to get built case by case until either Congress amends PLCAA or the Court decides one of these cases is the right vehicle to step in. Today’s denial was not that vehicle.

SCOTUS Upholds NY Law Allowing Lawsuits Against Gunmakers | The Daily Signal

The third notable cert denial on Monday was the end of the road for Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. in its long-running trade-secret fight with DXC Technology — the successor in interest to Computer Sciences Corporation. TCS had asked the Court to review a Fifth Circuit decision that affirmed a $168 million judgment against it for misappropriating CSC’s life-insurance-administration software trade secrets and using them to build TCS’s own BaNCS platform, which TCS then used to win a $2.6 billion contract with the insurer Transamerica.

The Northern District of Texas verdict, returned in 2022, had been $56 million in compensatory damages and $112 million in punitives, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the punitives ratio in 2025 over TCS’s BMW v. Gore and State Farm v. Campbell challenge to the proportionality of the punitive award and over its Defend Trade Secrets Act extraterritoriality arguments. The cert petition pressed both points and pressed a circuit split on the standard for proving misappropriation by an independent contractor that had been given access to source code under a nondisclosure agreement, but the Court declined.

The practical immediate effect is that TCS will recognize a roughly $70 million one-time exceptional charge in Q1 of its 2027 fiscal year and the total exposure on the matter — combining the affirmed judgment with previously taken provisions — settles in around $220 million. The broader effect is doctrinal stability. The Fifth Circuit’s analysis on cross-border trade-secret damages and on the extraterritoriality limits of the DTSA stand. Both questions are going to recur, and the next vehicle that brings them up may catch the Court in a different mood, but for now the law is what the Fifth Circuit said it was.

US Supreme Court rejects TCS challenge in $168 million trade secrets case | Business Standard

This Day in Legal History: Magna Carta Sealed at Runnymede

On this day in 1215, in a meadow at Runnymede on the south bank of the Thames, King John of England affixed his seal to a document the rebellious English barons had drafted, in which the king conceded a series of limits on his own royal authority. We call it Magna Carta — the Great Charter. The immediate political context was a baronial revolt against John’s tax exactions for his disastrous French wars, and most of the sixty-three chapters as drafted in 1215 are concerned with the highly specific grievances of a feudal aristocracy: scutage, wardship, the inheritance fees of widows, the freedom of the church, the standardization of weights and measures in the king’s markets. The two chapters that the centuries have remembered are 39 and 40. Chapter 39 says that no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. Chapter 40 says that to no one will the king sell, deny, or delay right or justice. The Charter was annulled by Pope Innocent III within ten weeks of sealing — the pope held that John, as a vassal of the Holy See, could not be bound by a treaty extracted under duress — and the country immediately collapsed into the First Barons’ War. But John died in October 1216, his nine-year-old son Henry III’s regents reissued the Charter as a tactical concession the next month, it was reissued again in 1217 and 1225, and by the late thirteenth century the 1225 version had been confirmed by successive kings as a foundational statute of the realm. Edward Coke, writing in the seventeenth century, transformed Chapter 39’s “law of the land” into the doctrine of due process, and the founding generation of the American Republic picked up Coke’s reading and wrote it directly into the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The phrase “due process of law” in those amendments is the most consequential American inheritance from the Runnymede document. The principle the barons were trying to extract from a beleaguered king — that the law constrains the sovereign too — is the substrate on which everything we recognize as constitutionalism is built. Eight hundred and eleven years on, the principle is still the work.

The Rhode Island travel-ban lawsuit we covered on June 8 took a sharp turn on Friday. Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr., of the District of Rhode Island held a status conference in Dorcas International Institute v. USCIS at which he was openly frustrated with the Justice Department for failing to immediately implement his June 5 vacatur of the four USCIS benefit-freeze policies for nationals of the thirty-nine travel-ban countries. The judge’s message, in plain terms, was that vacatur under the Administrative Procedure Act is self-executing — the moment the order was entered, the policies ceased to exist, and the agency was obligated to resume processing affirmative benefits, asylum claims, and adjudicator-instruction reviews on the prior pre-freeze basis.

The Trump administration, after the hearing, told the court it would comply, restart adjudications, and clear the backlog. It also did what defendants typically do when they have lost on the merits and lost again on compliance: it filed a notice of appeal with the First Circuit and asked the appellate court to stay the vacatur pending appeal. That is the live question now. The First Circuit’s stay analysis runs through the standard Nken v. Holder factors — likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest — and the administration’s strongest argument on each is going to be familiar: the executive needs administrative breathing room to implement a travel ban, mass restoration of adjudications creates national-security risk, the harm to applicants is reversible if their adjudications are paused for a few more weeks.

The plaintiffs’ strongest counterarguments are also familiar: the policies were unlawful when adopted and the agency had no business adopting them, the harm to applicants from continued delay is concrete and accruing daily, and the First Circuit is not in the business of staying vacaturs of unlawful agency action in order to let the agency continue acting unlawfully. Watch the First Circuit’s calendar this week. The stay motion is the next inflection point.

Trump officials agree to resume asylum processing after being scolded by judge | The Washington Post

Google filed suit on Friday in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against a China-based cybercrime network it calls the “Outsider Enterprise,” alleging that the network’s members used Google’s Gemini large-language model to generate the code, copy, and templates for a phishing-as-a-service platform that has built more than nine thousand fraudulent websites and sent two and a half million scam text messages in the two weeks ending June 1 alone. The complaint is significant for two reasons.

First, it is, to Google’s knowledge, the first time the company has affirmatively sued threat actors for using its own generative-AI product as the input to a scaled criminal operation, as distinct from the more usual posture of suing scammers who impersonate Google brands. The legal theories are a mix of Lanham Act false-designation-of-origin and trademark-infringement counts, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act counts based on Outsider’s unauthorized access to Google services, breach-of-contract counts on the Gemini terms of service, and a RICO count.

Second, the factual record will be a road map for the next decade of AI-misuse litigation. The complaint describes Telegram channels in which Outsider members trade prompts that get Gemini to write phishing code, a library of two hundred and ninety prebuilt templates impersonating brands ranging from the U.S. Postal Service to state DMVs to E-ZPass, and an FBI estimate that the broader campaign Outsider participates in has stolen roughly 3.87 million card numbers and caused $1.9 billion in losses since July 2023.

The remedy Google is seeking is a permanent injunction shutting the operation down, plus domain seizures and account terminations across Google’s services and at major U.S. carriers, which Google says it has been coordinating with the FBI, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon. The deeper legal question the case may end up clarifying is whether and to what extent platforms can use private civil suits as the front-line enforcement mechanism against AI-augmented criminal activity that the public criminal-justice system has had trouble keeping up with.

Google sues Chinese cybercrime ring that weaponized Gemini AI for phishing scams | TechCrunch

A federal district judge in Washington on Friday issued a preliminary injunction barring the Trump administration from continuing to implement Executive Order 14253, the order under which the National Park Service had been scrubbing exhibits, signage, and online materials at sites administered by the Department of the Interior. The judge gave the administration three weeks to restore the materials it had already removed.

The order at issue, signed in March, directed federal cultural agencies to identify and remove content that, in the executive’s view, reflected “improper, divisive, or anti-American ideology” or “partisan” framing. In the months that followed, the National Park Service had taken down or altered displays addressing slavery, the Civil Rights Movement, the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War, climate change, and the histories of Native American dispossession at sites including the Stonewall National Monument, Independence Hall, and the Manzanar National Historic Site.

The case is American Historical Association v. Department of the Interior, brought by historians’ professional associations and a coalition of plaintiffs that includes affected park employees and visitor-experience contractors. The legal theory pleaded was multi-strand: First Amendment viewpoint discrimination as applied to government speech that has taken on a public-forum character, Administrative Procedure Act challenges on the ground that the agency failed to provide a reasoned basis for the removals and failed to consider statutory commands under the Organic Act of 1916, and a Federal Records Act challenge to the destruction of materials that constituted federal records.

The judge held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the First Amendment claim and the APA claim, found irreparable harm in the ongoing loss of public access to the underlying historical materials, and found that the public interest was best served by restoration. The administration is widely expected to appeal to the D.C. Circuit. In the meantime, the three-week restoration clock is running.

Judge blocks Trump national parks order, calling it “censorship” | The Washington Post

This Day in Legal History: Loving v. Virginia Decided

On this day in 1967, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous opinion in Loving v. Virginia striking down Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924 and, with it, the anti-miscegenation statutes that sixteen states still had on the books. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the Court. The case had come up from a county courthouse in Caroline County, Virginia, where Richard Loving, a white bricklayer, and Mildred Jeter, a Black and Native American woman, had been arrested in their bedroom in the middle of the night in 1958 by a sheriff acting on an anonymous tip — they had been married in the District of Columbia and returned home to Virginia, where their marriage was a felony. The Lovings pleaded guilty, accepted suspended sentences on the condition that they leave the state for twenty-five years, and lived in exile in Washington until Mildred wrote a letter to Attorney General Robert Kennedy that landed eventually with the ACLU, which took the case.

The Supreme Court’s opinion did two things at once. It held that Virginia’s statute violated the Equal Protection Clause because it drew an explicit racial classification with no legitimate state purpose beyond preserving “White Supremacy” — the Court used the phrase the Virginia statute itself had used — and it held that the statute violated the Due Process Clause because the freedom to marry is “one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” That second holding, the marriage-as-fundamental-right strand, is the through-line that runs from Loving to Zablocki v. Redhail in 1978, to Turner v. Safley in 1987, to Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015 — every one of those decisions cites Loving and treats it as the foundational case. Whether the Court’s substantive due process marriage doctrine survives the next decade is, as we discussed earlier this week, one of the open questions in American constitutional law. But Loving itself remains intact, and on June 12, 1967, the Court said something it had not said cleanly before: that the right to marry is the kind of liberty interest the Constitution actually protects.

The Supreme Court on Thursday reversed the Second Circuit in FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., holding 6-3 that the Investment Company Act of 1940 does not give private parties a cause of action to seek rescission of fund bylaws or other contractual terms. Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote the majority. The dispute came out of a campaign by Boaz Weinstein’s Saba Capital against eleven closed-end funds — funds that, under Maryland’s Control Share Acquisition Act, had adopted bylaws limiting the voting power of any shareholder who accumulated a disproportionate stake without the consent of other shareholders. Saba sued under Section 47(b) of the ICA, which makes contracts that violate the Act unenforceable, and the Second Circuit held that Section 47(b) implied a private right to rescind the bylaws.

The Court told the Second Circuit to look harder at the modern implied-cause-of-action doctrine, which since Alexander v. Sandoval in 2001 has been hostile to inferring private rights of action that Congress did not write into the statute. The opinion reads as a continuation of that line: the ICA’s enforcement structure is committed to the SEC, not to private plaintiffs, and Section 47(b) is a defense against contracts the SEC has already determined to be unlawful, not an offensive cause of action. The dissent, by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that this is a misreading of Section 47(b)’s text and that the majority is gratuitously narrowing the enforcement of the federal securities laws. The practical impact is significant. Activist investors who had been pushing closed-end funds to convert to open-end form, or to alter investment strategies, lose a federal-court tool they had been using; the funds themselves and their independent directors gain a meaningful structural defense. Expect the next round of activist campaigns to move to state-court fiduciary-duty theories instead.

US Supreme Court rules against private suits brought under key securities law | US News

The Court on Thursday also decided Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc., vacating the Fifth Circuit 9-0 in an opinion by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. The case is small in its facts and large in its doctrine. Thomas Keathley filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2019 and failed to disclose, on his schedule of assets, a personal-injury claim he later brought against a construction company over a truck accident. The Fifth Circuit barred the personal-injury suit on judicial-estoppel grounds — the longstanding equitable doctrine that prevents a party from taking one position in one proceeding and a contradictory position in another — using a three-factor test under which a debtor’s mere knowledge of the facts plus a motive to conceal was enough to bar the later claim.

The Supreme Court said no.

To determine whether the omission was inadvertent or mistaken for judicial-estoppel purposes, the Court held, the lower courts must look to the totality of the circumstances, not just to whether the debtor knew of the facts and had a motive. The doctrinal interest of the case lies in two concurrences. Justice Sotomayor, concurring, wrote that judicial estoppel should likely never apply in an open bankruptcy case at all — the trustee can simply amend the schedule and pursue the claim for the estate, which solves the problem judicial estoppel was invented to address. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, went further and questioned whether federal courts have any inherent authority to apply judicial estoppel as a freestanding doctrine, period — a position that, if it ever gets five votes, would unwind a doctrine that has been part of American practice since the 1850s. None of that is the holding. But the votes to revisit one of the duller corners of equitable estoppel are now visibly on the table.

Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. | SCOTUSblog

The third unanimous decision of the day was Abouammo v. United States, in which the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and vacated the obstruction-of-an-FBI-investigation conviction of Ahmad Abouammo, a former Twitter employee whose underlying case was one of the more striking Saudi-Arabia infiltration prosecutions of the last decade. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the opinion. The facts are simple and the constitutional point cleaner than the facts. Abouammo, while working at Twitter’s San Francisco office in 2014 and 2015, accessed and passed on confidential user information about Saudi dissidents to a Saudi official, in exchange for a $42,000 watch and $200,000 in wire transfers. The FBI eventually came to interview him at his home in Seattle, where he had moved by 2018, and during those interviews he created and emailed agents a fake invoice intended to make the wire transfers look like a legitimate consulting fee. The Justice Department charged the obstruction count along with foreign-agent and wire-fraud counts in the Northern District of California, and a San Francisco jury convicted him on all of them.

The Supreme Court held that the obstruction count belonged in the Western District of Washington, not California, because the act of creating and sending the false invoice — the only act that supported the obstruction charge — happened entirely in Seattle. Article III’s venue clause and the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement together do not let the government try a defendant in a state where no element of the charged offense occurred, no matter how convenient the prosecution. The obstruction conviction is vacated. The foreign-agent and wire-fraud convictions, which had different venue facts and were not before the Court, stand. Abouammo will not walk free. But the prosecution will need to decide whether to retry the obstruction count in Seattle, and the case is now a clean precedent that the venue clause has real teeth in a multi-district federal investigation.

US Supreme Court overturns ex-Twitter employee’s obstruction conviction in Saudi spy case | US News

This Day in Legal History: Wallace Stands in the Schoolhouse Door

On this day in 1963, Alabama Governor George Wallace physically stood in the doorway of Foster Auditorium at the University of Alabama to block the registration of Vivian Malone and James Hood, the two Black students whose enrollment had been ordered by a federal district court. Wallace’s “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door” was the culmination of a long campaign of state defiance of federal desegregation orders that ran from Brown v. Board in 1954 through Cooper v. Aaron in 1958 — the case in which a unanimous Supreme Court told the Little Rock school district, and by extension every state actor, that federal constitutional rulings are the supreme law of the land and that state officials may not nullify them.

President Kennedy responded to Wallace’s stand by issuing Executive Order 11111, which federalized the Alabama National Guard, and ordering Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach down to Tuscaloosa to confront the governor. Wallace gave a long speech invoking states’ rights and Tenth Amendment sovereignty, then stepped aside, and Malone and Hood walked in and registered. That night, Kennedy went on national television and delivered the civil rights address that put the Civil Rights Act of 1964 onto the national agenda. The legal and political throughline matters: the schoolhouse door, the executive order federalizing the Guard, the televised address, and the omnibus civil rights legislation that followed were a single coordinated federal response to massive resistance, and the institutional habit they built — the willingness of the federal political branches to back federal court orders with whatever force is necessary — is the substrate on which the modern enforcement of civil rights law sits. Whether that habit holds up under contemporary pressure is one of the live constitutional questions of our moment.

The “Anti-Weaponization Fund” saga we have been following all week reached at least a partial resolution on Wednesday when Judge Leonie Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia declined to extend her temporary restraining order against the program into a preliminary injunction. The reason, in essence, is that the Justice Department has now formally represented to the court, in writing and through acting Attorney General Todd Blanche, that the $1.8 billion fund is “not going forward.” Brinkema took DOJ at its word for present purposes and dissolved the TRO, which under standard mootness doctrine is the right call when a defendant credibly commits to abandoning the challenged program. But she also did something practical: she warned the government in plain terms not to “play possum with this court,” language that gives the plaintiffs a built-in mechanism to come back fast if the fund quietly re-emerges under a different name.

The substantive theory the plaintiffs were pressing — that the fund is an unappropriated expenditure of public money, that the underlying Trump-IRS settlement was a litigation in which the United States was never really adverse to the President in his personal capacity, and that the program’s payout criteria are based on political characterizations of past prosecutions rather than any neutral standard — is now preserved for another day rather than litigated to judgment. The practical lesson is the durability of voluntary-cessation doctrine: a government defendant who is willing to abandon a program in court usually wins on mootness, but the cost is real, because future revivals get scrutinized against the prior representation. Watch the Federal Register and the DOJ component-level budget submissions for the next six months — if there is a successor program coming, those are where the first signal appears.

Judge declines to halt “anti-weaponization fund” since Blanche says it’s dead, but warns DOJ not to “play possum” | CBS News

A coalition of environmental and tribal-nation plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on Wednesday seeking to block a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service-approved land exchange that would transfer 715 acres of the Lower Rio Grande Valley National Wildlife Refuge to SpaceX, in return for 683 acres of privately owned land elsewhere. The plaintiffs are the Center for Biological Diversity, Save RGV, the Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas, and the South Texas Environmental Justice Network.

The legal theory of the case is unusually multi-statute: the complaint alleges violations of the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, the National Historic Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, with the central administrative-law argument being that the Fish and Wildlife Service’s environmental analysis failed to grapple seriously with impacts on endangered ocelots, aplomado falcons, and a long list of migratory species whose habitat the refuge was designed to protect when Congress created it in 1979. The plaintiffs describe this as one of the largest national-wildlife-refuge land exchanges outside Alaska, and the suit asks for vacatur of the exchange decision rather than damages — the standard APA remedy.

The political and infrastructural backdrop is hard to miss: SpaceX’s Starbase facility at Boca Chica has been expanding into the Lower Rio Grande Valley for years now, and the exchange would consolidate the company’s footprint on land previously held for the protection of one of the last remaining ocelot ranges in the country. The merits of the case will turn on the rigor of the FWS environmental analysis. Expect a request for a preliminary injunction within weeks.

Lawsuit challenges Trump administration’s land swap with SpaceX in Texas | The Washington Post

A Los Angeles County jury on Wednesday added $22 million in punitive damages to the $176 million compensatory verdict already entered against socialite and former philanthropist Rebecca Grossman and former Major League Baseball pitcher Scott Erickson, bringing the total civil award to the Iskander family to roughly $198 million.

The underlying facts of the case are stark: in September 2020, Grossman and Erickson left a Westlake Village restaurant after drinking and street-raced separate Mercedes SUVs through a residential neighborhood, with Grossman striking and killing two young brothers, Mark and Jacob Iskander, then 11 and 8, as they crossed a marked crosswalk with their parents.

Grossman was convicted of two counts of murder in 2024 and is serving 15 years to life. The civil case the family brought is the wrongful-death companion, and the punitive damages award the jury added on Wednesday is the part that does the most policy work: the jury split the punitive award $21 million against Grossman, $1.17 million against Erickson, which under California’s reprehensibility-and-net-worth framework reflects both the much greater direct culpability of Grossman as the driver and the substantial disparity in their respective financial positions.

The case is notable beyond the parties involved because of how clean it is on the standard punitive-damages analysis the Supreme Court laid out in BMW v. Gore and State Farm v. Campbell: high reprehensibility, a relatively modest single-digit ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages, and an underlying compensatory award that itself was supported by the gravity of the loss. Watch for an appeal that focuses on the compensatory rather than the punitive number — that is where the appellate leverage actually is.

Jury Ups Philanthropist, Ex-Pitcher Crash Verdict To $198M | Law360

This Day in Legal History: Kennedy Signs the Equal Pay Act

On this day in 1963, President John F. Kennedy signed the Equal Pay Act, the first federal statute aimed directly at sex-based wage discrimination. The law took the form of an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which meant that it slid into an existing enforcement framework run by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor — a deliberate choice that bypassed the need to build new institutional machinery and harnessed thirty years of FLSA caselaw and habits of compliance. The legal hook is the Act’s “equal pay for equal work” command: employers may not pay employees of one sex less than employees of the opposite sex for jobs requiring “equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.”

Four affirmative defenses are written into the text — a seniority system, a merit system, a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or “any other factor other than sex” — and that fourth catch-all has done more work in litigation than the other three combined, shaping how courts evaluate market-based, education-based, and prior-salary-based pay differentials decades later. The wage gap at the moment Kennedy signed was about 59 cents on the dollar; six decades on, by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s standard measure, it sits closer to 84 cents. That tells you something about how a clean, structurally well-designed statute can still leave a lot of the work undone, because the gap is and always was about more than identical pairs of jobs at the same employer.

The Equal Pay Act is not the whole story of American workplace-equality law; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and a long line of state-law analogues do much of the modern enforcement work. But June 10, 1963 is the day Congress, with the President’s signature, said for the first time that paying a woman less than a man for the same work was unlawful, full stop. Everything that has followed in this corner of the law has been built on top of that sentence.

The Federal Circuit on Monday affirmed a Delaware district court judgment invalidating four Purdue Pharma patents covering an abuse-deterrent, low-toxicity version of the opioid OxyContin, in a decision the patent bar has been waiting on for months. The case is Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Epic Pharma LLC. The patents covered Purdue’s reformulation of OxyContin to make the pills crush-resistant and to reduce a manufacturing impurity, and the asserted innovation grew, the company said, out of its discovery of the source of a particular toxic impurity that had previously eluded chemists at competing labs. Purdue’s argument on appeal was, in essence, that the discovery of the impurity’s source was itself nonobvious, and that the resulting patents inherited that nonobviousness. The Federal Circuit said no.

The panel held that the relevant obviousness inquiry asks whether the claimed reformulation — not the discovery that motivated it — would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, and that once the prior art is taken into account, the answer is yes. The practical consequence of the ruling is large. It opens the door wider for generic abuse-deterrent OxyContin alternatives and clarifies a doctrinal point pharmaceutical companies have been pressing on for years: a hard-won research insight does not, on its own, automatically save a patent from obviousness if the resulting product was within the prior art’s reach. Purdue’s options now are a rehearing petition at the Federal Circuit, a cert petition at the Supreme Court (which the company has already pursued in a related case last spring), or quiet acceptance. Expect a cert petition. Expect the cert petition to be denied. Watch the generic-drug filings that follow.

Fed. Circ. Panel Backs Invalidation Of OxyContin Patent

The plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Virginia lawsuit over the Trump administration’s $1.8 billion “Anti-Weaponization Fund” — a story we covered earlier htis week— went back to Judge Leonie Brinkema on Tuesday and asked for permission to conduct limited discovery into whether the Justice Department’s recent representation that it would stop work on the fund is a real commitment or a litigation convenience.

The plaintiffs’ problem is straightforward: acting Attorney General Todd Blanche has filed papers saying the program is “not going forward,” but President Trump publicly described the fund last week as a “great idea” that many Republicans support, and the executive order that created the fund has not been formally rescinded. From a litigation-strategy standpoint, the plaintiffs do not want to walk away from a live case on the strength of a DOJ filing, accept dismissal as moot, and then find out three months later that the fund has been quietly resurrected under a different name.

Judge Brinkema has a hearing scheduled for Friday, June 12, on whether to extend the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. The Tuesday filing teed up the broader mootness fight that will dominate Friday’s hearing: when does a federal agency’s promise to stop doing something actually deprive a court of jurisdiction to enjoin the underlying program, and what discovery, if any, is a plaintiff entitled to before that determination is made. The doctrine here — voluntary cessation, capable of repetition yet evading review, and the heavy burden the Supreme Court has placed on the party claiming mootness — favors the plaintiffs procedurally. Whether Brinkema agrees on Friday is the question to watch.

‘Anti-weaponization’ fund challengers question its demise – Roll Call

SCOTUSblog’s John Elwood walked through a useful relist roundup on Tuesday, and the four cases sitting in the relist pile are worth flagging because each of them touches a different load-bearing wall in federal practice. The first is a prolonged-detention challenge to immigration custody under Section 1226(c). The ACLU is asking the Court to clarify that very long mandatory-detention periods trigger procedural due process review under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, picking up on the Second Circuit’s willingness to do so. The second is Newberry v. Texas, a case where Texas itself has confessed error — a rare procedural posture in which the State agrees the defendant should win — and the question is what the Court does when the parties on both sides ask for the same remedy. The third is Kian v. Florida, a Sixth Amendment challenge to the use of six-person juries in serious felony cases, on the theory that the historical understanding of “jury” in the founding era assumed twelve and that the Court’s mid-twentieth-century cases approving six-person juries were wrong on the originalist analysis. The fourth is Maxwell v. Thomas, a federal habeas case asking whether the First Step Act‘s halfway-house and home-confinement provisions are properly enforceable through 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petitions, an issue with a real circuit split. None of these have been granted yet — they are relists, which means at least one Justice is interested but the Court has not yet decided whether to hear them — but the mix is the part to watch: it tells you what the Justices are circling without committing to. Expect at least one of these to be granted before the term ends.

A random assortment of relists: prolonged detention, confessions of error, small juries, and new rules on habeas | SCOTUSblog

This Day in Legal History: The Burning of the Gaspee

On this day in 1772, a Royal Navy revenue schooner called HMS Gaspee, captained by a notably overzealous Lieutenant William Duddington, ran aground in shallow water in Narragansett Bay while chasing a Rhode Island packet boat called the Hannah. Within hours of the grounding, roughly sixty Providence merchants, sailors, and “Sons of Liberty” — led by John Brown, one of the wealthiest men in the colony — rowed out under cover of darkness in eight longboats, boarded the Gaspee, shot Duddington, and burned the ship to the waterline. The legal significance lies in what came next. The Crown convened a Royal Commission of Inquiry with authority to ship the perpetrators across the Atlantic for trial in England, bypassing colonial juries entirely, a procedural maneuver that the colonies read as a direct attack on the right to jury trial in the vicinage.

The Virginia House of Burgesses responded in March 1773 by forming the first Committee of Correspondence, a sustained intercolonial communication network that became, two years later, the institutional skeleton of the Continental Congress. The Gaspee Affair never produced a single prosecution — the commission could not get the colonial governor or the Rhode Island courts to cooperate, and witness testimony evaporated — but it produced something more durable: the colonial conviction that the Crown’s willingness to detour around local juries was itself a constitutional grievance worth organizing against. The right-to-jury-in-the-vicinage point that Madison wrote into the Sixth Amendment seventeen years later is, in a real sense, the Gaspee Affair’s longest-lived legacy.

The Supreme Court on Monday granted, vacated, and remanded the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Gas Association v. Department of Energy, sending the long-disputed Biden-era Department of Energy efficiency rule on non-condensing residential gas furnaces and commercial water heaters back to the D.C. Circuit “for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General.” That last phrase is the operative one. The new Solicitor General, on behalf of the second Trump administration’s DOE, told the Court in late April that the prior administration’s reading of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act was, in DOE’s current view, wrong, and that the rule effectively bans non-condensing units that millions of homes and small commercial properties were built around. A confessed-error from a new administration doesn’t automatically win a case, but the procedural vehicle — a grant-vacate-remand, or “GVR” — is the Court’s standard way of saying “go look at this again with the new posture in mind” without resolving the merits itself.

The trade-group plaintiffs, led by the American Gas Association and the American Public Gas Association, framed the rule from the start as a de facto product ban dressed up as efficiency standards. The environmental and consumer groups that intervened to defend the rule will get another bite at the apple on remand, but their position is harder when their own client agency has switched sides. Watch the D.C. Circuit’s case calendar over the next few weeks for an expedited briefing schedule.

Supreme Court Vacates Decision Outlawing Gas Stoves, Water Heaters | NewsBusters

SCOTUSblog on Monday published a careful overview of an increasingly organized litigation campaign to ask the Supreme Court to overrule Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. The campaign now includes Liberty Counsel, MassResistance, and the Southern Baptist Convention, which last year voted overwhelmingly to urge the Court to reverse the decision. The underlying ground for the push is partly the Court’s reasoning in Dobbs four years ago, which gave conservative litigants a road map for unwinding substantive due process precedents, and partly the gradual erosion of public-opinion support for same-sex marriage in one slice of the polling, with Republican support falling from 55 percent in 2022 to 37 percent now. The legal headcount at the Court is, however, the part of the story that is not yet there.

Only Justice Thomas has been a consistent vote to revisit Obergefell, having said so in his Dobbs concurrence. Justice Alito, despite being one of Obergefell’s original dissenters, recently emphasized in a public speech that he is not suggesting the case should be overruled, citing stare decisis. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in 303 Creative seems to concede that Obergefell is good law and tries instead to carve out specific exceptions to it. None of which is a reason for litigants on the marriage-equality side to relax. The path Dobbs opened up is wider than any single justice’s current voting pattern, and the campaign is plainly playing a long game.

The next round of test cases on standing and ripeness will start to surface in the lower courts in the next term or two — that is when the campaign’s seriousness becomes measurable.

The campaign to overrule Obergefell | SCOTUSblog

The third and most constitutionally significant story of the day is one we’ve been watching: the litigation over President Trump’s $400 million ballroom — built on the site of the demolished East Wing — is on track to land in front of the Supreme Court, SCOTUSblog reported Monday. The D.C. Circuit panel that heard the case for more than two hours in late April has not yet ruled, but the questioning made clear that a more substantial opinion is coming and that an appeal to the Court is the likely next stop regardless of which side wins. The legal question is unusually fundamental. The plaintiff, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, argues that the President has no “free-floating” power to construct major federal buildings without an appropriation from Congress, and that the Antideficiency Act and the Public Buildings Act both require the kind of statutory authorization the East Wing ballroom never received.

The administration’s response, delivered in a tone that several court-watchers described as unusually defiant, has essentially been that construction has “gone too far to be stopped” and that the courts have no role in second-guessing a presidential building decision once the steel is up. The structural separation-of-powers questions here — what does the Appropriations Clause actually constrain, and can a federal court enjoin a President from continuing to build something that is partially constructed — are large enough that the Supreme Court will almost certainly want to take the case if it reaches the high court. Construction, meanwhile, continues. The most likely Supreme Court resolution is a narrow opinion on standing or remedies, with the broader Appropriations Clause questions deferred for another day. We will see.

White House ballroom battle may soon arrive at the Supreme Court | SCOTUSblog

In my Bloomberg Tax column this week, I argue that the SALT deduction cap’s biggest problem is not that it is unconstitutional, but that it is badly designed. The latest failed challenge, Sims v. United States, involved two New Jersey taxpayers who claimed the cap violated the 10th Amendment, the 16th Amendment, and broader federalism principles. The federal district court rejected those arguments, finding that Congress has broad authority to tax income and decide which deductions are allowed, limited, or denied. My point is that opponents of the SALT cap should stop looking for constitutional defects that courts are unlikely to find and instead focus on forcing Congress to fix the policy it created.

I explain that the cap has always been politically loaded: supporters see it as a needed limit on a deduction that benefits many high-income taxpayers in high-tax states, while critics see it as a targeted attack on those states. But unfair or politically motivated tax policy is not automatically unconstitutional. The real weakness, I argue, is the cap’s uneven design, especially the pass-through entity tax workaround. Many business owners can effectively get around the cap when state taxes are paid at the entity level, while wage earners, sole proprietors, and many individual taxpayers remain stuck behind it.

That creates a serious mismatch: two taxpayers can live in the same state, earn similar income, and face similar state tax burdens, but receive different federal treatment depending on whether one has the right business structure. I argue that this kind of selective relief may be a more promising target for a narrower administrative or legal challenge than another broad constitutional attack on Congress’s taxing power. Congress partly recognized the problem when it raised the cap from $10,000 to $40,000, but I note that the fix is temporary, only lightly indexed, and still leaves major structural problems in place. The marriage penalty remains especially glaring because married couples filing jointly do not receive double the cap available to similarly situated unmarried taxpayers.

I also criticize the phaseout design because it can create cliffs or marginal-rate spikes that reward tax gamesmanship rather than sound policy. A better fix, in my view, would make the higher cap permanent, index it meaningfully, eliminate the marriage penalty, smooth out the phaseout, and require Treasury to rationalize the treatment of pass-through entity taxes. The lesson from Sims is that courts may uphold the SALT cap, but that does not make it good tax policy. If the cap is unfair, incoherent, or selectively porous, Congress owns that problem.

SALT Deduction Cap Falls Short in Design, Not Constitutionality

This Day in Legal History: Madison Introduces the Bill of Rights

On this day in 1789, James Madison rose from his seat in New York’s Federal Hall — then the temporary capital of the new federal government — and gave the speech in which he introduced a list of amendments to the Constitution that we now know as the Bill of Rights. Madison had been, until quite recently, a skeptic of attaching a bill of rights to the federal Constitution: he had argued at the Constitutional Convention and in The Federalist that the structure of enumerated and separated powers was a better protection of liberty than a “parchment barrier” of textual rights, and he worried that any enumeration would be read to imply that whatever was not enumerated was not protected. What changed his mind was politics.

The Antifederalist opposition in several states had made ratification conditional on amendments protecting individual rights, and Madison — by then a member of the First Congress — concluded that introducing such amendments himself was the surest way to defuse a broader constitutional convention movement that might unravel the work of 1787. The list he proposed on June 8 was longer and somewhat different from what eventually became the Bill of Rights; the House debated it through the summer, passed seventeen amendments in August, the Senate reduced them to twelve in September, and ten of those — the ones we now call Amendments I through X — were ratified by the states on December 15, 1791. June 8 is the date a reluctant convert stood up and made the case that has carried American constitutional law ever since: the proposition that the government’s structural restraint is necessary but not sufficient, and that the rights of speech, conscience, due process, and the rest deserve to be written down where everyone can read them.

Chief Judge John J. McConnell, Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island on Friday vacated four U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services policies that had, since late last year, frozen work permits, green-card adjudications, naturalization, and asylum claims for nationals of roughly 39 countries on the second Trump administration’s travel ban list. The case, Dorcas International Institute of Rhode Island v. USCIS, No. 1:26-cv-00132, was brought by a coalition of immigrant-service organizations and labor unions. Judge McConnell held that all four policies — a “Benefits Hold” freezing affirmative benefits for travel-ban country nationals, a Global Asylum Hold halting asylum processing across the board regardless of country of origin, a Comprehensive Re-Review Policy requiring USCIS to re-examine previously approved benefits, and a separate adjudicator-instruction policy treating travel-ban country origin as a negative factor — are unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The legal hook is familiar APA territory: the agency, McConnell concluded, failed to provide a reasoned explanation for the freezes and failed to account for the substantial reliance interests of hundreds of thousands of pending applicants. What makes this ruling stand out is the remedy. Other district courts that had blocked these policies in the last six months issued preliminary injunctions limited to named plaintiffs; McConnell vacated the policies themselves, which under standard APA practice means they cease to operate nationwide. That puts USCIS in the position of either rescinding the policies, going back to the drawing board with proper rulemaking, or appealing to the First Circuit and trying to get the vacatur stayed. Expect movement on all three fronts this week.

US Judge Strikes Down Trump Policies Targeting Immigrants From 39 Countries | US News

U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia entered a temporary restraining order on Friday blocking the Trump administration’s $1.8 billion “Anti-Weaponization Fund” from disbursing any money while the underlying lawsuit proceeds. The fund — created by executive order earlier this year and funded out of a settlement the administration brokered in the Trump-IRS litigation we covered in early June — was meant to compensate people the administration described as victims of the Biden Justice Department’s “weaponization” of federal law enforcement, with the first contemplated payments going to defendants and witnesses from the January 6 prosecutions. Plaintiffs include former DOJ attorney Andrew Floyd and other former federal prosecutors who argue, in essence, that the fund is an unauthorized expenditure of public money: Congress never appropriated it, the settlement that supposedly funds it is itself under judicial review for whether the United States was actually adverse to the President in his personal capacity, and the program’s payout criteria are based on political characterizations of past prosecutions rather than any neutral standard.

Judge Brinkema’s order, narrowly drawn to “ensure that no funds are irreversibly disbursed,” set a June 12 hearing on whether the freeze should be extended into a preliminary injunction. By the end of last week the situation had escalated further: on June 5 the Justice Department told two federal judges, in writing, that it would stop work on the fund altogether and that the lawsuits challenging it are now moot. That representation will be tested at this Friday’s hearing, because the plaintiffs are not satisfied with a unilateral DOJ promise and want a binding court order before they go away. Watch for what Brinkema does with that disagreement on Friday.

Justice Department says it will stop work on $1.8 billion “anti-weaponization fund” after judge’s ruling | CBS News

A divided Seventh Circuit panel on Friday upheld Indiana’s law restricting who may attend an execution at the Indiana State Prison, holding that the First Amendment does not give reporters a right of access to be present at the execution itself. Judge Michael Scudder wrote the 2-1 majority. The plaintiffs — the Associated Press, the Indiana Capital Chronicle, Gannett, WISH-TV, and TEGNA, represented by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press — had argued that the long line of Supreme Court cases recognizing a First Amendment right of press and public access to criminal proceedings, from Richmond Newspapers forward, extends to the carrying out of capital sentences, particularly given Indiana’s recent resumption of executions after a long pause and a 2024 statute that omitted journalists from the list of permitted witnesses. The panel disagreed.

The majority emphasized that Indiana’s witness list — the warden, execution staff, the prison physician, a chaplain, the prisoner’s spiritual adviser, up to eight family members of the victim, and up to five unspecified additional witnesses — leaves journalists free to interview those who did attend, report on every other aspect of the proceeding, and comment on the state’s choice to impose or carry out the sentence, and that there is no constitutional difference between watching the execution and reporting on it secondhand. The opinion’s most striking passage, candidly weighed against the press claim: allowing “uninvited strangers with no immediate connection to the underlying crime” to watch a prisoner die “risks offending the dignity of their final moments.” The dissent argued the press’s structural role in informing public deliberation over the death penalty depends on first-hand observation. The split sets up a possible petition for rehearing en banc and, in the longer run, a circuit-split-ready vehicle if other circuits go the other way.

7th Circ. Says Ind. Can Bar Press From Attending Executions | Law360

This Day in Legal History: Congress Repeals the Gold Clause

On this day in 1933, Congress passed the Joint Resolution that voided the gold clauses written into nearly every long-term contract and bond obligation in the United States, both public and private. The resolution declared that any provision purporting to require payment “in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency” was “against public policy,” and that obligations could be discharged dollar for dollar in whatever legal tender currency was in force at the time of payment. It was a remarkable act of legislative power: a one-paragraph statute that rewrote the payment terms of millions of existing contracts overnight, in the middle of the Great Depression, to make Franklin Roosevelt’s recent abandonment of the gold standard actually stick. The Supreme Court took up the inevitable challenge two years later in the Gold Clause Cases — Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio, Nortz v. United States, and Perry v. United States — and in February 1935 it upheld the resolution as applied to private contracts by a 5-4 vote, while telling the United States, in Perry, that it had violated its own contractual word in repudiating gold-payment promises on government bonds, but that the bondholder had suffered no compensable injury. The doctrinal residue of that compromise is still with us: Congress can use its monetary powers to alter private contract terms retroactively when monetary policy requires it, the rule that has quietly underwritten every major monetary intervention since, from Bretton Woods to the post-2008 emergency lending programs. June 5 is not a day most lawyers mark on the calendar, but the resolution Congress passed on this date is one of the cleanest examples in American law of a legislature using its enumerated powers to dissolve a contract term that had been considered, until that moment, untouchable.

The Supreme Court on Thursday handed Hikma Pharmaceuticals — and the entire generic drug industry — a 9-0 win in a case that had been hanging over the so-called “skinny label” pathway for years. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, writing for a unanimous Court in Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., held that Amarin, the maker of the brand-name fish-oil drug Vascepa, had not plausibly alleged that Hikma actively induced infringement of Amarin’s patents covering a still-patented cardiovascular use of the drug. The skinny label is a feature of Hatch-Waxman generic-drug law that lets a generic manufacturer copy only the unpatented uses of a brand drug by literally carving the patented uses out of its FDA-approved label, which is supposed to let cheaper generics reach the market for the unpatented indications even while patents on other indications are still in force. Brand companies have been trying for years to sue around that carve-out under the active inducement statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), by pointing to generic press releases, marketing language, or website descriptions and arguing that doctors could read those statements as encouragement to prescribe the generic for the still-patented use. The Federal Circuit had bought a version of that argument and revived Amarin’s case. The Supreme Court rejected that approach, and the test that Justice Jackson articulated is meaningful: the question is not how doctors might interpret what a generic manufacturer said, but whether the manufacturer itself actively encouraged the infringing use. Neutral statements that could be read as instructions to infringe do not count. The practical effect is to shore up the skinny label pathway and make it harder for brand companies to weaponize induced infringement against generic competition. The decision was originally framed as a pharmaceutical-industry case, but its inducement standard will reach across patent law generally and into every industry where § 271(b) gets litigated.

It’s unanimous: SCOTUS agrees with Hikma in ‘skinny label’ case vs. Amarin | Fierce Pharma

Also unanimous on Thursday: the Supreme Court in Sripetch v. SEC held that the Securities and Exchange Commission can obtain disgorgement of a wrongdoer’s ill-gotten gains without having to prove that any individual investor lost money. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the opinion for a 9-0 Court, which is itself a small surprise given the Court’s recent pattern of skepticism toward broad SEC remedial powers. The case came out of a penny-stock pump-and-dump scheme that Ongkaruck Sripetch ran across some 20 small companies — buy shares quietly, promote them aggressively, sell into the bubble — and the SEC won an order requiring him to disgorge roughly $3 million. Sripetch’s argument on appeal was that disgorgement is supposed to be tied to investor harm, that the SEC had not shown specific pecuniary losses traceable to him, and that the order was therefore not the kind of equitable relief the Court approved in its 2020 Liu v. SEC decision. The Court disagreed, on traditional equity principles: disgorgement, the Court explained, is measured by the defendant’s unjust gain, not the plaintiff’s quantified loss, and equity has always been willing to strip a wrongdoer of profit even when the victim cannot mathematically prove harm. The practical importance for the SEC is enormous — the agency reports collecting roughly $1.4 billion in disgorgement in fiscal 2025 alone, and a contrary ruling would have forced the SEC into an evidentiary burden that pump-and-dump and insider-trading cases are notoriously bad at supplying. The opinion is also a reminder that the Court’s recent administrative-state skepticism is not all in one direction: when the question is grounded in old equity doctrine, the same justices who narrowed SEC adjudication in Jarkesy are willing to leave the agency’s remedial toolkit intact.

US Supreme Court Backs SEC in Fight Over ‘Disgorgement’ Power | US News

The third and most constitutionally significant of Thursday’s rulings was FCC v. AT&T, in which the Supreme Court upheld 8-1 the Federal Communications Commission’s longstanding practice of imposing forfeiture penalties on regulated carriers through its own in-house process, without first giving the carrier a jury trial. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority, with Justice Clarence Thomas the lone dissenter. The case grew out of the FCC’s headline-making fines against AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint for selling access to real-time customer location data to third parties without consent — fines that ran nearly $200 million across the four carriers, with AT&T’s portion at $57 million and Verizon’s at $46.9 million. The carriers challenged the fines on Seventh Amendment grounds, arguing that the Court’s 2024 decision in SEC v. Jarkesy — which struck down the SEC’s in-house adjudication of securities-fraud penalties as a violation of the jury-trial right — should reach FCC forfeitures too. The Court said no, on a structural distinction that matters: an FCC forfeiture order is not self-executing. The FCC cannot collect on its own. If a carrier refuses to pay, the matter is referred to the Justice Department, which then has to file a civil action in federal district court — a proceeding in which the carrier is entitled to a full jury trial and the government has to prove the violation de novo, with no deference to the FCC’s findings. That collection-stage jury trial, Roberts wrote, is enough to satisfy the Seventh Amendment, even though the agency itself first issues the penalty. Justice Thomas’s dissent argued the in-house process is no less coercive than the SEC adjudication the Court rejected in Jarkesy and would have extended Jarkesy here. The practical takeaway: agency in-house penalty proceedings survive after Jarkesy if there is a real, downstream jury-trial backstop. Expect every regulator with a similar two-step enforcement structure to point to this opinion the next time someone tries to push Jarkesy further.

Court rules against cell service providers over right to jury trial in FCC proceedings | SCOTUSblog

This Day in Legal History: Congress Passes the Nineteenth Amendment

On this day in 1919, the U.S. Senate voted 56 to 25 to approve the Nineteenth Amendment, sending to the states a one-sentence constitutional rule that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” The House had already passed it two weeks earlier, by a comfortable margin, and the question now moved to the states, where ratification would take fourteen months of careful organizing and a now-legendary single vote by a Tennessee legislator named Harry Burn — cast on his mother’s instruction — to clinch the 36-state threshold in August 1920. The Nineteenth Amendment did not by itself enfranchise all American women: Black women in the South, women of color across the country, and Native women living on tribal land would face decades more of state-level disenfranchisement that did not begin to ease until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and would not be fully addressed even after that. But June 4, 1919 was the day that women’s suffrage stopped being a state-by-state campaign and became, at the federal level, a constitutional commitment. The structural lesson is one worth holding onto: in the United States, voting rights live not just in the Constitution but in the day-to-day administration of elections by the states — which is why the fight over them is never quite over.

Senators John Kennedy of Louisiana and Ron Wyden of Oregon — a Republican and a Democrat who do not often appear in the same headline — jointly introduced the Open Courts Act on Tuesday, a bill that would do something the federal judiciary has talked about for two decades and never quite accomplished: replace PACER, the public court records system, with a modern interface, eliminate the per-page fees, and harden the cybersecurity around the federal judiciary’s electronic filing system. PACER stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, and right now it charges users ten cents a page to read federal court filings, which adds up alarmingly quickly when you’re trying to follow a case of any size. The bill would also require the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to build a new system funded outside the regular appropriations cycle, which the sponsors argue would save taxpayers about $60 million a year in operating costs and avoid the budget-fight ritual that has stalled past reforms. The cybersecurity piece is not incidental: the federal courts have suffered two significant intrusions in recent years, one reportedly tied to Russian actors in 2025 and a similar one in 2020, and Wyden has been pushing for an independent security review since last year. The legal stakes here are unusual because PACER is a public-access tool that has historically been priced like a paywalled subscription product, which is a kind of legal-transparency contradiction the U.S. has tolerated longer than almost any peer democracy. Kennedy’s framing — “Americans should not have to sell plasma or wrestle with clunky government websites just to read public court records” — is the kind of soundbite the bill needs to actually move. Whether it actually moves is another question; previous versions of this bill have died quietly. Watch the Judiciary Committee in the next month.

Bipartisan Bill Would Modernize Court Records Systems | Law360

The Department of Justice has opened an investigation into former U.S. Representative George Santos for possible insider trading on Kalshi, the federally-regulated prediction-market exchange, after Kalshi itself reportedly flagged a pattern of suspicious wagers to prosecutors. The story, broken by Reuters on Wednesday, is one of the first big public test cases for how insider trading principles map onto event-based contracts — which are not stocks, are not commodities in the traditional sense, and have spent the better part of the last two years in regulatory limbo while Kalshi and the CFTC fought in federal court over whether the platform could list its contracts at all. The legal challenge is real: insider trading liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 historically requires a “security,” and Kalshi contracts are not securities — they sit under the CFTC’s authority as “event contracts.” That leaves DOJ working with commodities-fraud theories, wire-fraud statutes, and potentially Santos’s own conditions of release from his prior unrelated criminal sentencing, all of which apply differently and less neatly than they would in an old-fashioned stock-trading case. If you are wondering how an ex-Congressman ends up with material nonpublic information worth betting on Kalshi, you are asking the right question, and it is also the question prosecutors will have to answer if they want any of this to stick. Expect this to become a defining test case for how event-contract markets get policed.

DOJ investigating ex-US lawmaker Santos for insider trading on Kalshi, source says | Reuters

In my column for Bloomberg this week, I write about a pattern emerging across California, Minnesota, Oregon, Illinois, Washington, Maine, and other states: lawmakers are reaching for the politically powerful phrase “wealth tax” to describe what are, on inspection, just new top brackets or surtaxes on high-income earners. I argue that the slippage is not just sloppy branding, it is a strategic mistake. A wealth tax and an income surtax are not the same thing — wealth is a stock and income is a flow, and a higher rate on income realized this year will never reach the accumulated balance-sheet fortunes that the wealth-tax conversation was actually designed to capture. The “buy, borrow, die” critique that motivates much of the wealth-tax movement is precisely about taxpayers who never realize income because they never need to: they hold appreciating assets, borrow against them for liquidity, and defer or escape income-tax recognition entirely. Adding a few points to the top marginal income-tax rate, I write, is just a slightly higher toll at the same toll booth — it does not reach the wealth that bypassed the toll entirely. The political-capital point is what worries me most. Wealth taxes pick a specific kind of fight — about asset valuation, billionaire flight, capital mobility, constitutional limits, and the like — and to spend that capital fighting that fight on behalf of what is in fact a different and more familiar policy is a strange trade. I think a more honest framing would serve both sides better: if states want a real wealth tax, they need to design one — with valuation rules, third-party reporting, anti-avoidance, residency standards, and liquidity protections — and if they want a high-income surtax, they should call it that and defend it on its own merits. The middle ground gets you the burden of a tax hike without the benefits of either. Half measures that cost full price in political capital, I conclude, are not helping anyone.

States Should Avoid Using ‘Wealth Tax’ Rhetoric for Income Taxes | Bloomberg Tax (Technically Speaking)

This Day in Legal History: The National Defense Act of 1916

On this day in 1916, President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense Act, the law that quietly built the legal scaffolding for how the United States deploys soldiers, both abroad and at home, for the next century-plus. The Act roughly tripled the size of the regular Army, formally created the National Guard as a federalized reserve force out of the patchwork of state militias that had existed since the founding, and established the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps at colleges and universities.

The legal hook is the dual-status structure that the Act created and that we still use today: the National Guard belongs simultaneously to its state and to the federal government, normally takes orders from the governor, but can be “federalized” by the President under specific statutory authorities and pulled out of state command for federal missions. That structure has driven a long line of constitutional fights about the limits of presidential authority to call up the Guard, about whether and when the Insurrection Act applies, and about how the Posse Comitatus Act constrains the use of federal troops for domestic law enforcement. June 3 is not a day most people associate with American military law, but the 1916 statute is doing quiet work behind every modern headline about troops at a border, troops in a city, or troops in a hurricane.

The Eleventh Circuit on Tuesday handed down a ruling that strips hip-hop group 2 Live Crew of the copyrights it thought it had successfully clawed back to five of its albums, including “As Nasty as They Wanna Be,” because one member’s bankruptcy from the 1990s swept his future termination rights into the bankruptcy estate. Federal copyright law has a wonderfully democratic provision in Section 203: an author who signed away a copyright can, 35 years later, send a termination notice and take it back, regardless of what the original contract said.

The catch the Eleventh Circuit identified is Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, which scoops up almost everything you own into the bankruptcy estate when you file — including, the court said, the right to send that termination notice years later, even though the right cannot be sold or contracted away in any other context. The practical consequence for 2 Live Crew is that member Mark Ross, who performed as Brother Marquis, had unwittingly transferred his future termination interests to his bankruptcy trustee when he filed Chapter 7 years earlier, so when the group’s heirs and surviving members later tried to take the copyrights back from Lil’ Joe Records in 2020, they were one vote short of the majority the statute requires.

The case, Lil’ Joe Records v. Christopher Won Jr. et al., No. 24-13978, is described in the opinion as “a question of first impression at the intersection of copyright and bankruptcy” — which is lawyer-speak for “we just made up the rule, and now it’s the rule.” Expect every copyright-termination case where any author has ever filed for bankruptcy to cite this decision for the next decade.

11th Circ. Reverses 2 Live Crew’s Copyright Clawback Win | Law360

President Trump on Tuesday quietly signed a finalized version of the AI cybersecurity executive order that he had abruptly scrapped during a planned signing ceremony on May 21, and the final version is notably narrower than the one that was on the table a month ago.

The new order asks Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and other federal agencies to design a voluntary framework under which developers of so-called frontier AI models — the largest and most general-purpose systems — would share their models with the federal government for up to 30 days before public release so the government can scan for security vulnerabilities. The legal posture is worth pausing on: this is a voluntary framework, not a regulation, which means it lives in the same constitutional space as a chamber-of-commerce best-practices document rather than as a binding rule subject to APA notice and comment.

That structure is partly a workaround for the fact that there is no federal statute giving any agency authority to mandate pre-release safety testing of AI models, and partly a response to industry pressure: Trump explained on May 21 that he scrapped the earlier 90-day version because he thought it could be “a blocker” to U.S. leadership in AI. Whether developers actually opt in is the open question, and the order is structured so that participation will likely depend on a mix of national-security pressure, federal procurement leverage, and quiet diplomacy with the major labs. Expect the first real fight to be over what counts as a “frontier” model, and who decides.

Finalized Trump Order Seeks Early Cyber Tests Of AI Models | Law360

The U.S. Senate on Tuesday confirmed Katie Lane to be a federal district judge in Montana, making her the first judicial nominee of Trump’s second term to be confirmed despite a “not qualified” rating from the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. The ABA’s role here is informal but historically important: since 1953 the Standing Committee has rated federal judicial nominees as “well qualified,” “qualified,” or “not qualified” based on professional competence, integrity, and judicial temperament, and the rating has carried real weight with senators of both parties — until it didn’t.

The Trump administration formally cut ties with the ABA review process during the first term, on the theory that the ABA’s ratings reflected an ideological bias against conservative nominees, and the second administration has been even more open about ignoring “not qualified” ratings as a matter of policy. The legal stakes of this are modest in any individual case — a “not qualified” judge serves the same lifetime appointment with the same constitutional power as a “well qualified” one — but cumulatively the practice changes the relationship between the bar and the bench in a way that is hard to undo, and it nudges the federal judiciary in a direction that depends almost entirely on the political branches’ definitions of professional fitness.

Lane, who is now confirmed, will join the District of Montana, a small but busy bench. Watch this space: there are several more nominees in the pipeline with similar ratings.

US Senate confirms Trump judicial nominee deemed ‘not qualified’ by ABA | Reuters

This Day in Legal History: The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924

On this day in 1924, President Calvin Coolidge signed the Indian Citizenship Act, also called the Snyder Act, declaring that all Native Americans born within the territorial limits of the United States were U.S. citizens. It is one of those laws that sounds, in retrospect, like it cannot possibly have been necessary — and yet it was. For most of the country’s first 150 years, the federal government treated Native people as members of separate sovereign nations whose status under American law was, at best, ambiguous. Earlier vehicles for citizenship — the Fourteenth Amendment, the Dawes Act, military service in World War I — had reached only some Native people, and a string of Supreme Court decisions had taken the position that being born inside the United States to a member of a tribe did not, on its own, make a person a citizen.

The Snyder Act fixed that with a single sentence.

What it did not fix was voting: many states continued to bar Native citizens from the ballot for decades afterward, on a variety of pretexts that were eventually struck down one by one. The Act also did not affect tribal citizenship — Native people are dual citizens of their tribe and the United States, which is part of why federal Indian law continues to occupy a separate doctrinal universe. June 2 is a quietly important date on the calendar of American citizenship, and a reminder that the seemingly obvious questions of who counts as an American have, for long stretches of our history, not been obvious at all.

Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier announced Monday that his office has filed a civil lawsuit against OpenAI and its CEO Sam Altman, arguing that the company is misleading parents about the safety of ChatGPT and pointing to incidents in which young users were allegedly nudged toward violence by the chatbot. The complaint follows a criminal investigation Uthmeier’s office opened in April, after a deadly mass shooting at Florida State University in 2025 that the AG says ChatGPT helped facilitate. Florida is asking for civil penalties and an order forcing OpenAI to redesign the product, including adding meaningful parental controls.

The legal angle here is essentially a state consumer-protection theory: a state attorney general claiming that the company’s marketing of a product as safe-for-kids is deceptive, and that the company is therefore on the hook under the state’s unfair-trade laws. Whether that survives a motion to dismiss is going to depend a lot on whether the court treats ChatGPT as a “product” in the traditional sense — software has, for decades, gotten more leeway than physical products under product-liability law, and Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act has historically immunized platforms for what users post.

The new wrinkle is that generative AI doesn’t fit neatly into either bucket — ChatGPT produces its own output rather than hosting somebody else’s — and several courts are now beginning to grapple with that distinction. Expect this case to be one of the early test cases for how AI companies get sued in the U.S.

Florida AG Sues OpenAI, Says ChatGPT Spurs Violence | Law360

The Supreme Court on Monday declined to hear an appeal from asbestos victims who had challenged a corporate bankruptcy tactic known as the “Texas Two-Step” — leaving in place a Fourth Circuit ruling that lets companies use the maneuver to corral mass-tort claims into bankruptcy court.

The Two-Step works like this: a healthy company splits itself into two using a Texas state-law provision that allows divisional mergers, dumps its asbestos or talc or opioid liabilities into the newly created spinoff, and then puts only the spinoff into Chapter 11. The result is that injury claimants get herded into a bankruptcy proceeding where their leverage is sharply limited, even though the parent company that actually caused the harm is still solvent and operating.

The case the Supreme Court turned away involved Bestwall, a spinoff of Georgia-Pacific that has been in Chapter 11 since 2017. The Third Circuit threw out a similar Johnson & Johnson talc-unit bankruptcy in 2023 on the ground that the spinoff wasn’t actually in financial distress, but the Fourth Circuit went the other way in this case, and the Supreme Court’s denial of review leaves that split standing for now. The bigger picture: a powerful settlement-shaping tool stays on the menu for corporate defendants facing waves of mass-tort litigation, and the next big talc, opioid, or asbestos defendant looking to manage a docket of claims now knows the Two-Step is at least available in the Fourth Circuit.

Justices Won’t Hear Challenge To ‘Texas Two-Step’ Ch. 11 | Law360

A group of IKEA customers filed a proposed class action against the Swedish retailer Monday in U.S. federal court, arguing that they overpaid for furniture during the period when President Trump’s import tariffs were in effect — tariffs that the Supreme Court has since struck down — and that they are entitled to a share of the refunds the company will now collect from the federal government. It is one of the first big consumer-side cases to follow the Supreme Court’s tariff ruling, and the legal theory is novel: importers paid the tariffs, then passed those costs through to consumers in the form of higher sticker prices, and now that the government is sending refunds back to importers, the customers who effectively bore the cost are asking for a piece of that money.

Some major shippers like FedEx and UPS have already publicly committed to passing tariff refunds back to their customers; IKEA, the suit alleges, has not. Whether the claim survives depends largely on whether the court is willing to treat the relationship between retailer and customer as something like a constructive trust or unjust enrichment, rather than an arm’s-length sale at a final price. If even one of these cases succeeds, expect copycat suits against every other large importer that quietly built tariff costs into retail prices over the last several years.

IKEA customers sue for share of Trump tariff refunds | Reuters

This Day in Legal History: The First Act of Congress

On this day in 1789, President George Washington signed the first statute ever enacted by Congress under the new Constitution — “An Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain Oaths,” codified at 1 Stat. 23. The substance was modest: the law prescribed the form of the oath that members of Congress, federal judges, and executive officers were to take to support the Constitution, and gave the states a window in which to swear in their own officials. But the symbolism was enormous. It was the first time the new federal government did the thing governments actually do, which is to pass a law and require people to obey it, and the choice of subject was telling.

Before Congress regulated commerce, levied taxes, or built courts, it bound its own officers to the Constitution by oath. The oath clauses in Article II and Article VI have been doing quiet doctrinal work ever since: they ground the Supremacy Clause, they undergird Marbury’s claim that judges are bound to follow the Constitution as supreme law, and they sit at the center of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3 disqualification debate that the Supreme Court took up in Trump v. Anderson just two years ago. The Oath Act of 1789 is not the kind of statute that gets quoted on bar exams, but it is the original instance of Congress speaking in legal form, and everything the federal government has done since rests on top of it.

Uber went after one of its own bellwether plaintiffs Friday in the sprawling multidistrict litigation over alleged passenger sexual assaults, asking U.S. Magistrate Judge Lisa J. Cisneros in the Northern District of California to impose sanctions on plaintiff B.L. and her counsel at Wagstaff Law Firm for what Uber called “pervasive bad faith” in discovery.

The headline accusation, made by Kirkland & Ellis’s Michael Vives for Uber, is that B.L.’s privilege log cites cases that don’t exist — what Vives suggested may be “hallucinated case law” generated by an AI tool — and Vives floated that as an independent basis for sanctions on top of the alleged document withholding, redactions, and undisclosed witnesses Uber catalogued in its April motion.

he legal vehicle here is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, which gives a federal court a tiered menu of sanctions for discovery misconduct — fees and costs at the low end, adverse-inference instructions and claim preclusion at the high end — and Uber is asking the court to throw B.L.’s case out of the next bellwether wave entirely. Judge Cisneros noticed during the hearing that what struck her about the briefing was the pattern, not any single incident; she pointed to one example where the plaintiff identified a person as a “friend” and only later produced a fuller set of text messages showing the person was actually a therapist.

The judge ordered the plaintiff to file a sur-reply by Thursday before ruling, which means a sanctions order is now teed up. The case sits within In re Uber Technologies, Inc., Passenger Sexual Assault Litigation (MDL No. 3084) before Judge Charles R. Breyer, and any sanctions ruling will set the tone for how the rest of the bellwether pool conducts discovery. If the hallucinated-caselaw piece sticks, this also becomes one of the first real Rule 11 / Rule 37 hybrid sanctions vehicles for generative AI misuse in the MDL context — and the bar will be reading it closely.

‘Pervasive Bad Faith’: Uber Targets Sex Assault MDL Plaintiff | Law360

The Seventh Circuit on Friday told the Northern District of Illinois that the now-standard practice of serving Chinese e-commerce defendants by email in “Schedule A” trademark cases doesn’t fly under the Hague Service Convention — at least not when the convention applies, which is a question the district court has to actually answer first. The dispute came up in Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., No. 25-2205, where the hat-maker Kangol sued more than twenty Chinese vendors for trademark infringement and identified them on a sealed “Schedule A” exhibit attached to the complaint — the same procedural pattern that drives the enormous Schedule A docket in Chicago’s federal court.

Kangol got a default judgment after serving the defendants by email, but one defendant, Hangzhou Chuanyue, appeared and moved to vacate, arguing that the Hague Convention prohibits email service in China and that the convention applies because Hangzhou’s address is discoverable. The legal hook is Article 10(a) of the Hague Service Convention, which permits service “by postal channels” only when the destination state has not objected — and China has affirmatively objected to Article 10(a), full stop.

The Seventh Circuit, citing the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, held that whether or not email counts as a “postal channel,” Article 10(a) is unavailable in China, so email service in this case was improper if the convention applied at all. The panel — Judges Thomas Kirsch, Candace Jackson-Akiwumi, and Doris Pryor — reversed the denial of Hangzhou’s motion to vacate and sent the case back for the threshold question the district court skipped: did Kangol make reasonably diligent efforts to find Hangzhou’s address, which would have triggered the convention.

The practical fallout will reach hundreds, possibly thousands, of pending Schedule A cases in Chicago that rely on email service as a matter of course, and plaintiff firms in this space will be scrambling to redo their service strategy.

7th Circ. Revives Chinese IP Defendants’ Email Service Case | Law360

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on Thursday transferred Randall King’s proposed class action — the vehicle for a proposed $7.25 billion Roundup settlement with Monsanto — into the Northern District of California MDL before Judge Vince Chhabria, despite vehement objections from absent class members who want the case to stay in Missouri state court.

The case-within-a-case is unusual: the King action was filed and preliminarily settled in Missouri state court, then a group of objectors (represented by Keller Postman) removed it to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, and the JPML then tagged it for transfer to the consolidated Roundup MDL. The legal hook here is 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the JPML’s transfer authority — paired with CAFA’s removal rules, which the settling plaintiffs argue were misused because the objectors aren’t “defendants” within the meaning of § 1453 and so cannot remove.

The objectors counter that the $7.25 billion deal “launders a liability-management scheme through the courts” by funneling claims of Roundup cancer victims through a Missouri state-court class that an MDL judge would never approve, and they want federal-court scrutiny under Rule 23 and the standards Judge Chhabria has spent years developing in the Roundup litigation. Monsanto, for its part, is on the objectors’ side of the venue question — at least tactically — telling Law360 that the case should go back to Missouri state court and it will move to oppose the transfer order.

The whole fight is also tied up with the Supreme Court’s pending decision in a separate Monsanto case that will determine whether the deal survives at all, because the proposed $7.25 billion is structured around what the Court does there. Whichever way this remand/transfer fight comes out, it is going to be cited in every future class-settlement-jurisdiction tug-of-war for the rest of the decade.

$7.25B Roundup Deal Sent To Calif. MDL | Law360

A U.S. district judge in Florida said Saturday she will take a closer look at the settlement the Trump administration has reached with itself — or more precisely, with President Trump in his personal capacity — over a long-running IRS lawsuit, scheduling further proceedings to examine whether the deal can stand.

The procedural posture is what makes this one interesting: the case involves a federal agency under the President’s control settling claims with the President personally, which raises immediate questions about whether anyone is actually adverse to anyone, and whether the resulting consent decree or stipulation can carry the legal weight a normal settlement does.

The legal mechanism the judge appears to be invoking is the federal court’s inherent supervisory authority over consent decrees and settlements involving the federal government, an authority that runs through cases like Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland and that the Tunney Act formalizes for antitrust settlements — though here there is no Tunney Act, just the general principle that a federal court doesn’t have to rubber-stamp a settlement when there are serious questions about whether the United States was actually represented in the negotiation.

The hearing on the issue was set for late May in Miami, with the judge reportedly skeptical that the deal can be approved without further factual development. The political stakes are obvious, but the legal stakes are arguably bigger: if the court can refuse to approve the settlement on the ground that the executive branch was not adverse to itself in any meaningful way, it would create a precedent that constrains every future administration’s ability to make its own personal litigation go away through agency action. Expect this one to generate appellate motion practice within weeks.

US judge orders review of Trump’s IRS lawsuit settlement | Reuters

This Day in Legal History: Rhode Island Ratifies the Constitution, 1790

On this day in 1790, Rhode Island became the thirteenth and final original state to ratify the United States Constitution, doing so by a margin of 34 to 32 at a convention in Newport. Rhode Island’s hesitation had been considerable: the state refused to send delegates to the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, and twice rejected ratification in popular referenda — a curiously democratic method for refusing to join a constitutional union founded in part on the premise that pure direct democracy is dangerous. The state’s small-farmer and debtor classes, the same constituencies that had backed the paper-money policies that horrified Madison, were deeply suspicious of a strong federal government that would constrain state-issued currency, ban impairment of debt contracts (Article I, Section 10), and override state-level debtor protections.

Ratification finally came under the gun: Congress, frustrated by the foot-dragging, was openly threatening to treat Rhode Island as a foreign nation for tariff purposes, which would have devastated the Providence merchants. The convention’s narrow margin reflected a hostile deal more than a meeting of constitutional minds.

Importantly, Rhode Island’s ratification was conditioned on a lengthy list of proposed amendments — many of them mirroring the Bill of Rights that James Madison had already shepherded through Congress in September 1789 and that would be ratified in December 1791. With Rhode Island in, the original Union was at last complete, and the practical question of whether the new federal government could function with one stubborn holdout fell away. The episode is a useful reminder that the constitutional founding was not so much a singular moment as a slow, contested, occasionally coerced bargain — one that ended in Newport on a humid Saturday in May.

The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday handed down a narrow 5-4 ruling in Pitchford v. Cain, reviving a Mississippi death row inmate’s challenge to the prosecutor’s race-based use of peremptory strikes at his 2006 capital trial. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a majority that included Chief Justice Roberts plus Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, held that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson v. Kentucky’s three-step framework for challenges to peremptory strikes.

The Court found the trial judge accepted the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations without giving defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to argue that those reasons were pretextual, and the state appellate court compounded the error by treating that omission as a waiver. The prosecutor, Doug Evans, used four of his twelve strikes to remove four of the five Black prospective jurors, leaving a jury of eleven white jurors and one Black juror in a Mississippi county that was then roughly 40 percent Black.

The Court leaned heavily on its 2019 Flowers v. Mississippi decision, which involved the same prosecutor and the same trial judge and had already found Evans’s pattern of striking Black jurors discriminatory. Federal habeas relief was appropriate because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s deferential “no fair-minded jurist could agree” standard cannot rescue a state-court ruling that simply skips Batson’s third step. Justice Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justices Alito, Thomas, and Barrett, arguing the record showed counsel chose silence rather than being denied an opportunity. The case now returns to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings.

Justices Revive Mississippi Death Row Inmate’s Batson Claim | Law360

Caesars Entertainment agreed Thursday to be acquired by Tilman Fertitta’s privately-held Fertitta Entertainment in an all-cash deal valued at roughly $17.6 billion, including the assumption of approximately $11.9 billion of Caesars’ outstanding debt. Shareholders will receive $31 per share, a 49 percent premium over Caesars’ unaffected share price as of February 25, and the company will be delisted from Nasdaq upon closing. The agreement includes a go-shop period running through approximately July 11 — a Delaware deal-protection mechanism that lets the target board solicit competing bids without triggering a termination fee, and that helps insulate the sale process from a Revlon-flavored fiduciary-duty challenge by signaling the board actively tested the market after signing.

Latham & Watkins and Skadden are representing Caesars (the latter on antitrust), White & Case is advising Fertitta, and Freshfields is counseling the Carano family, which holds a roughly 5 percent stake and will roll part of its equity into the combined entity. The combined company would control more than 60 casino resorts and over 200 retail sports betting locations under the William Hill brand. Antitrust review will be the inflection point given the overlap on the Las Vegas Strip — where Caesars operates eight properties — and across digital betting. Funding will come from Fertitta equity and committed debt financing arranged by a syndicate of ten banks.

4 Firms Steer Fertitta’s $17.6B Caesars Entertainment Buy | Law360

The Department of Health and Human Services on Thursday finalized a long-awaited overhaul of the federal Independent Dispute Resolution process under the No Surprises Act of 2021, the statute that pulls most out-of-network billing fights out of the patient’s hands and into a baseball-style arbitration between provider and payer. The headline change slashes the per-party administrative fee from $115 to $15 per case, undoing a sharp 2023 hike that providers had successfully challenged in the Eastern District of Texas as having been adopted without notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The rule also expands batching, so economically similar items and services can be bundled into a single arbitration, which the agency says will cut transaction costs and ease the chronic IDR backlog. HHS is also rolling out a centralized federal dispute portal and a payer registry intended to fix the persistent problem of providers being unable to identify which entity is actually on the hook in any given case. Reactions from physician and radiology groups have been mixed, with broad support for the fee cut but lingering concern that the qualifying payment amount methodology — the benchmark arbitrators must consider — still tilts the field toward insurers. APA Section 706 challenges to portions of the earlier IDR framework remain pending in the Fifth Circuit.

US HHS finalizes rule to streamline dispute resolution under No Surprises Act | Reuters

ABC’s New York affiliate WABC-TV filed an objection with the FCC on Thursday, calling Chairman Brendan Carr’s April order requiring early license renewals for all eight ABC-owned stations an “unconstitutional” act of viewpoint-based retaliation barred by the First Amendment. WABC submitted its renewal under protest, arguing the agency has not demanded simultaneous early renewals from a commonly owned station group in more than fifty years and that the Media Bureau’s stated rationale — possible violations of the Communications Act of 1934 and the FCC’s nondiscrimination rules — is pretext for punishing disfavored editorial speech.

The doctrinal hook is the Bantam Books line of cases through last term’s NRA v. Vullo, which holds that government officials cannot use the implicit threat of regulatory sanction to coerce private intermediaries into suppressing protected expression. The order followed a separate FCC inquiry into whether “The View” has been violating the agency’s equal-time rule for political candidates, and came against the backdrop of repeated White House demands that Disney fire Jimmy Kimmel. Democratic Commissioner Anna Gomez has openly urged Disney not to “flinch.”

On the same day, the FCC issued a broader notice warning all broadcasters that licenses could be reviewed early if stations are deemed to be failing their statutory public-interest obligation — a posture that drops the question of broadcast licensing back into Red Lion-era First Amendment territory.

FCC Targeting ABC Licenses To Punish Speech, Station Says | Law360

This Day in Legal History: The Indian Removal Act of 1830

On this day May 28, 1830, President Andrew Jackson signed the Indian Removal Act, authorizing the federal government to “negotiate” the relocation of Native American tribes east of the Mississippi to lands in what is now Oklahoma. On its face the statute framed displacement as voluntary, treaty-based, and compensated; in practice it became the legal scaffolding for the forced expulsion of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole nations, culminating in the Trail of Tears.

The bill passed the House by just five votes, with Davy Crockett among its most prominent dissenters. The years that immediately followed produced the Marshall Court’s foundational Indian law trilogy — Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia — the last of which Jackson famously (and probably apocryphally) refused to enforce. The doctrinal residue of the Removal era is still in force today: tribes remain “domestic dependent nations,” Congress still claims a “plenary power” over them, and the Supreme Court is still relitigating what reservation boundaries actually mean — most recently in McGirt v. Oklahoma in 2020 and Haaland v. Brackeen in 2023. The 1830 Act was not the beginning of dispossession in North America, but it was the moment Congress took ownership of the policy and dressed it in the language of statute. Whatever else May 28 marks on the calendar, in legal history it marks the day removal became American law.

Dutch coatings giant AkzoNobel, the maker of Dulux paint, told Sherwin-Williams and Nippon Paint Wednesday that their €12.5 billion ($14.6 billion) joint takeover proposal is not a “superior proposal” and that the board would stay the course on its already-agreed merger with Axalta Coating Systems. The rejected offer, made at €73 per share, would have carved AkzoNobel up — Nippon taking the decorative paints business, Sherwin-Williams taking industrial coatings — and was the second pass after an earlier bid that the board had swatted away in April.

AkzoNobel’s reasons read like a Dutch corporate-law primer: the offer “did not come close to adequately reflecting” long-term value, the deal-certainty risk around regulatory clearances was too high, and the “interests of AkzoNobel stakeholders” were not adequately safeguarded. That last word is the legal tell. Under Dutch law, a listed company’s board is not bound by anything resembling Delaware’s Revlon duty to maximize shareholder value in a sale; it answers to a stakeholder model that explicitly weighs employees, creditors, suppliers, and the long-term interests of the enterprise alongside the shareholders. That gives a Dutch board far more room to reject a premium cash bid than a comparable U.S. target would have, especially with a friendly all-stock merger of equals (the Axalta deal) already on the table.

The combined AkzoNobel-Axalta entity, announced last November and worth roughly $25 billion, plans to list on the NYSE with dual HQs in Amsterdam and Philadelphia and Dutch tax residency — a structure that itself preserves the Dutch governance model post-close. The CMA in the U.K. has already opened a public comment period on the Axalta deal, and antitrust review is likely the live front to watch from here.

AkzoNobel Snubs €12.5B Sherwin-Williams, Nippon Paint Bid | Law360

The Trump administration is preparing to halt federal immigration and customs processing at airports located in jurisdictions it deems “sanctuary cities” or “sanctuary states,”, according to a report Reuters published. The mechanism, if implemented, would have Customs and Border Protection officers stop staffing inbound international arrival processing — meaning international passengers landing at, say, San Francisco, Boston, or Seattle would be unable to clear customs at those airports and would have to be diverted. The legal architecture here is unusual because CBP staffing decisions sit at the discretionary end of federal administrative law: the agency has wide latitude to deploy officers where it wants, and there is no statutory entitlement for any particular city to host a federal port of entry.

That said, a decision to use that discretion as punishment for a state or municipality’s refusal to honor ICE detainers would invite a familiar set of challenges — South Dakota v. Dole-style coercion arguments dressed up as preemption, anti-commandeering claims under Murphy v. NCAA and Printz v. United States, and APA challenges under State Farm to whatever administrative record the agency assembles. Several of the targeted jurisdictions have already won injunctions in earlier rounds of sanctuary-city funding fights, including against the prior conditioning of Byrne JAG grants on detainer compliance. The political move is obvious; the legal move is less so, and the administration will need to articulate a non-pretextual reason for the staffing change if it wants to survive arbitrary-and-capricious review. Whether airlines, airport authorities, or the states themselves will have standing to sue — and what kind of irreparable harm a redirected flight inflicts — is going to be the first set of questions a court has to answer.

US draws up plans to halt immigration, customs processing at ‘sanctuary city’ airports | Reuters

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Fourth Circuit’s decision reviving the National Association of Immigration Judges’ First Amendment challenge to a federal rule restricting what sitting immigration judges may say publicly about the agency that employs them. The per curiam opinion’s holding is narrow but striking: the Fourth Circuit, the justices said, committed an abuse of discretion by reviving the suit on a theory neither party briefed, a “drastic departure from the principle of party presentation” laid out in cases like United States v. Sineneng-Smith. The party-presentation principle is one of those background structural rules that doesn’t get a lot of airtime — the basic idea is that federal courts are passive instruments that decide the cases the parties bring them, not the cases judges wish the parties had brought — but here it became outcome-determinative.

Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, wrote separately to say the Fourth Circuit was also wrong on the merits because it ignored Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, the 2012 decision holding that the Civil Service Reform Act’s administrative-channeling regime is the exclusive route for covered federal employees to challenge adverse employment actions, even constitutional ones. The practical effect is that the immigration judges’ union now has to litigate its First Amendment claim through the Merit Systems Protection Board and then the Federal Circuit rather than in district court, and the case bounces back to the Fourth Circuit to redo the analysis on whatever ground the parties did actually raise. The Court also denied a cross-petition from the union. The case is Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges, No. 25-767; the merits cross-petition was No. 25-1009.

Justices Order Redo In Immigration Judges’ Free Speech Suit | Law360

A Sixth Circuit panel on Tuesday affirmed the dismissal of an attempt by Right to Life of Michigan and a group of parents to block enforcement of Proposal 3, the 2022 Michigan ballot initiative that wrote a fundamental right to reproductive freedom into Article I, Section 28 of the state constitution. The panel did not reach the merits — the case stopped at standing — and the opinion, written by Judge John K. Bush, is a clean illustration of how high the Article III standing bar is for pre-enforcement challenges of this kind. Standing requires the plaintiff to show an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, and the parents here couldn’t make the traceability link work: their theory was that the amendment might allow schools or other actors to help minors obtain contraception or abortion care without parental consent, but the complaint identified no specific enforcement action by Governor Whitmer, Attorney General Nessel, or Secretary of State Benson that was causing or threatening any such injury.

The panel reiterated the Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife framework and quoted approvingly the rule that a “general allegation” that an executive officer is “generally responsible for executing” state law does not, by itself, establish standing to sue that officer. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to bootstrap standing off the AG’s and governor’s authority to enforce Michigan’s consumer protection and civil rights statutes, calling those allegations too speculative. This is going to be the template for the next several rounds of post-Dobbs challenges to state constitutional reproductive-rights amendments: the merits questions about scope and federal preemption will keep coming, but plaintiffs are going to need a concrete enforcement target to even get a hearing.

6th Circ. Rejects Mich. Reproductive Rights Challenge | Law360

This Day in Legal History: Black Monday and the End of the NIRA

On May 27, 1935 — a day quickly dubbed “Black Monday” by the press — the United States Supreme Court delivered three unanimous decisions that gutted central pieces of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in a single morning. The most consequential was A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, in which the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act. The case grew out of the prosecution of a Brooklyn kosher poultry slaughterhouse for violating the “Live Poultry Code,” one of the hundreds of industry codes drafted by trade groups and given the force of federal law by the National Recovery Administration. The Court held that the NIRA’s code-making scheme was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private actors and the executive, and that the federal government’s Commerce Clause authority did not reach the intrastate sale of poultry to local butchers. Justice Cardozo, concurring, famously described the statute as “delegation running riot.”

The same day, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Court cabined the President’s power to remove members of independent regulatory commissions, a holding that would shape the constitutional status of agencies like the FTC, SEC, and FCC for the next ninety years. And in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Court invalidated the Frazier-Lemke Farm Bankruptcy Act as an uncompensated taking from secured creditors. Roosevelt was, by all accounts, furious — and Black Monday became the proximate cause of his 1937 court-packing plan, which failed in Congress but is generally credited with prompting the “switch in time” that produced the more deferential commerce-clause and administrative-law jurisprudence of Jones & Laughlin Steel and the decades that followed. The nondelegation doctrine the Court announced in Schechter has, famously, not been used to strike down a federal statute since — though it has been the subject of growing interest from the current Court’s conservative majority, which makes the ninety-first anniversary of Black Monday more than just a historical footnote.

Former President Joe Biden has sued the Department of Justice to block the release of audio recordings and transcripts from his interview with Special Counsel Robert Hur, the prosecutor who investigated Biden’s handling of classified documents and declined to bring charges. According to the filing, Biden argues that releasing the recordings would skirt federal law restricting disclosure of materials gathered in a special counsel probe, and would effectively turn protected investigative material into political fodder. The suit follows a 2024 Freedom of Information Act action by the conservative Heritage Foundation seeking the same recordings, and comes against the backdrop of repeated efforts by the current administration to make Hur-era material public — efforts the Biden team has argued are intended to embarrass the former president rather than to serve any legitimate investigative or oversight function. The transcripts of the Hur interviews were released back in 2024, but the audio itself has been the subject of executive privilege fights ever since. Worth watching for what the court does with the privilege claims, and for how the Special Counsel regulations are treated now that there is an ex-president on each side of these disputes.

Former President Biden sues DOJ over release of interview audio | Reuters

The Trump administration is asking a California federal judge to throw out an expanded challenge to its sweeping reorganization of the federal workforce, calling the litigation a “litigation safari.” In a Friday motion to dismiss filed in AFGE v. Trump, the administration urged Judge Susan Illston to toss a supplemental complaint that broadened the case to cover, among other things, the downsizing of FEMA and a set of forward-looking workforce planning documents the administration issued last October. The original suit, filed in April 2025 by a coalition including the American Federation of Government Employees, SEIU, and the cities of Chicago, Baltimore, and San Francisco, challenged layoffs and reorganizations at more than twenty federal agencies. Judge Illston enjoined the workforce plans last May, but the Supreme Court stayed her injunction in July, and she has since declined to dismiss the case outright.

The administration’s argument is essentially jurisdictional: that the October planning documents are too tentative to constitute “final agency action,” that there is no specific DHS order behind the FEMA contract lapses the plaintiffs point to, and that individual FEMA terminations must run through the administrative civil-service process rather than land in district court. The “litigation safari” framing — that the plaintiffs are simply “roving the executive branch to explore various employment issues” — is rhetorically catchy but glosses over the more interesting underlying question: how cleanly the Administrative Procedure Act’s “final agency action” requirement maps onto a coordinated, rolling, and openly cross-agency reorganization. A ruling on the dismissal motion is expected later this summer.

Trump Admin Looks To Ax Expanded Suit Over Staffing Cuts - Law360

Billionaire insurance magnate Greg Lindberg was sentenced in the Western District of North Carolina to twelve years in federal prison across two separate criminal cases — eighty-seven months on charges that he tried to bribe the state’s insurance commissioner, and 144 months on wire-fraud charges arising from a $2 billion scheme in which prosecutors said he treated the insurance companies he controlled as a personal piggy bank. The sentences will run concurrently. Judge Max Cogburn also entered a preliminary restitution order of $1.6 billion based on a court-appointed special master’s recommendation, which Lindberg’s defense team described as the largest restitution award in state history.

Prosecutors said the scheme harmed more than two hundred thousand victims, most of them elderly annuity holders, at least twenty thousand of whom died before any promised payouts arrived. The bribery case has its own complicated history — Lindberg was first convicted in 2020, had that conviction vacated by the Fourth Circuit in 2022 over faulty jury instructions, and was reconvicted on retrial in 2024. He pleaded guilty to the separate wire-fraud and money-laundering counts in November 2024. Judge Cogburn credited Lindberg’s “extraordinary cooperation” with prosecutors and the special master, but also noted, with what reads like real exasperation in the transcript, that Lindberg has continued to file pro se civil lawsuits against the insurance companies he once owned and that the case illustrates how much of our regulatory apparatus can be “bought and sold like sacks of potatoes.” The government had sought roughly fourteen and a half years; Lindberg had asked for four.

‘Regretful’ Billionaire Gets 12 Years For $2B Fraud, Bribery - Law360

The Colorado Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a debt buyer suing a consumer must attach to its complaint a non-affidavit writing that actually shows the buyer owns that consumer’s debt — not just a generic bill of sale showing that the buyer purchased some bundle of receivables from the original creditor. The case, Wright v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, involved a $671.29 Victoria’s Secret credit-card balance that Comenity Bank had sold to Portfolio Recovery in 2018. Portfolio Recovery’s complaint attached a bill of sale and an affidavit identifying the last four digits of Wright’s account number, and the lower courts found that sufficient under Colorado’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The Colorado Supreme Court, in the first opinion authored by recently appointed Justice Susan Blanco, reversed and held the affidavit could not cure a complaint that didn’t first satisfy the statute’s non-affidavit-writing requirement.

The practical consequence is significant: the four largest debt buyers alone filed close to forty thousand cases in Colorado county courts between 2013 and 2015, accounting for around eight percent of the state’s county-court civil docket, and many of those complaints have historically relied on exactly the kind of generic bill-of-sale-plus-affidavit packaging the court just rejected. Consumer advocates argue the ruling will help consumers — most of whom never had any relationship with the debt buyer — understand and respond to the suits filed against them; the debt-buying industry will, in the near term, need to retool its pleading practices statewide.

Colo. Justices Say Debt Buyer Must Show It Owns The Debt - Law360

This Day in Legal History: Andrew Johnson Impeachment Trial Ends

On May 26, 1868, the United States Senate ended the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson, bringing one of the most dramatic constitutional confrontations in American history to a close. Johnson had been impeached by the House of Representatives earlier that year after clashing repeatedly with Congress over Reconstruction. At the center of the dispute was the future of the defeated South and the legal status of formerly enslaved people after the Civil War. Johnson favored a more lenient approach toward former Confederate states, while the Republican-controlled Congress sought stronger protections for freedmen and stricter conditions for reentry. The immediate trigger for impeachment was Johnson’s attempt to remove Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, which Congress argued violated the Tenure of Office Act. The Senate had already voted on one article of impeachment on May 16, and Johnson survived by a single vote. Ten days later, on May 26, the Senate voted on two more articles, with the result again falling one vote short of the two-thirds majority required for conviction. The final vote of 35 to 19 meant Johnson would remain in office.

After that result, the Senate adjourned as a court of impeachment and the trial came to an end. The acquittal did not make Johnson politically strong, but it preserved the principle that removing a president required more than intense political disagreement. The trial also tested the separation of powers during a period when Congress and the presidency were fighting over who would control Reconstruction. In later years, the Tenure of Office Act was repealed, and its constitutionality remained deeply suspect. Johnson’s impeachment became a lasting example of how legal rules, political conflict, and constitutional design can collide in moments of national crisis.

The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has advanced a major five-year transportation funding bill that would send about $580 billion toward roads, bridges, transit, rail projects, and highway safety programs. The measure, called the BUILD America 250 Act, passed the committee by a 62-2 vote after a lengthy markup and now heads to the full House. The bill is meant to replace the current surface transportation law, which was part of the 2021 infrastructure package and is set to expire at the end of September. Supporters from both parties framed the proposal as a way to keep infrastructure funding moving while giving states flexibility and speeding up project delivery.

One of the most closely watched additions is a rail safety package inspired by the 2023 Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. That section would require at least two crew members on many trains, add inspection requirements, regulate defect detectors, and place limits on certain hazardous-material trains. Rail labor groups and the White House have backed stronger rules, while the major railroads argue the proposal is driven more by politics and labor demands than by the causes of the East Palestine crash.

The bill would also create a first federal regulatory structure for autonomous commercial vehicles, including automated trucks, buses, and other larger vehicles. Industry supporters say that framework would help the United States compete globally in autonomous transportation, while transit labor leaders say the bill includes important human-oversight protections to keep workers involved and improve safety. Another contested provision would impose a new annual federal registration fee on electric vehicle owners, starting at $130 and later rising to $150, to help support the Highway Trust Fund.

Backers say EV drivers should contribute to road funding because they do not pay federal gas taxes. Electric vehicle advocates, however, call the fee punitive and argue it would discourage EV adoption without meaningfully solving the trust fund’s long-term funding gap.

What’s In The House Surface Transportation Funding Bill? - Law360

The Justice Department has asked a federal court to lift an injunction blocking work on President Donald Trump’s ballroom project, arguing that a recent shooting outside the White House shows why stronger security is needed. In a short filing Sunday, DOJ said the incident highlights the need for high-level security upgrades at the White House, including the ballroom, and again sought dismissal of the lawsuit challenging the project. The case was brought by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, which has opposed the project and previously refused to withdraw its suit after an alleged foiled attack connected to the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner in April. DOJ had already cited that earlier incident in asking the court to end the case. According to the Secret Service, the person who fired at a White House checkpoint on Saturday was shot by officers and later died at a hospital. The filing ties the shooting to the government’s broader argument that the project is important for national security.

US Justice Department seeks to lift injunction on ballroom project after shooting | Reuters

My column for Bloomberg this week argues that Tennessee’s recent decision in SAP America, Inc. v. Gerregano shows how poorly traditional state tax categories fit modern software. The court treated SAP’s software licenses as nontaxable intangible property, while allowing Tennessee to tax cloud hosting and cloud-based services delivered electronically into the state. That split made sense because SAP’s products were cleanly separated into licenses, hosting, and cloud services. But the column argues that most modern software is not so tidy. Even products that seem local often rely on remote tools for logins, updates, syncing, storage, analytics, customer support, or payment processing. As AI becomes built into ordinary software, the line between software and cloud-based service will become even harder to draw.

The column focuses on the “true-object” test, which asks what the customer is really buying when a transaction has multiple elements. That test works when the taxable and nontaxable pieces are visible and separately priced, but it becomes much harder to apply when remote processing is hidden inside a product the customer experiences simply as software. The piece argues that states should adopt a software-specific safe harbor rather than treating every remote feature as taxable cloud access. Under that approach, software would be presumed to remain software when remote functions are limited to things like authentication, updates, syncing, security, or modest product enhancements. A state could rebut that presumption if the customer is really buying hosted processing, managed infrastructure, AI model access, inference, or other platform-level functionality. The point is not to abandon the true-object test, but to give it a clearer threshold for hybrid software. Without that guardrail, AI could give states an easy but flawed path to reclassify almost any software product with a remote model feature as taxable cloud access.

This Day in Legal History: Truman Doctrine

On May 22, 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed legislation authorizing American aid to Greece and Turkey, giving legal force to what became known as the Truman Doctrine. The law provided economic and military assistance to both countries at a moment when U.S. leaders feared that instability in the eastern Mediterranean could expand Soviet influence. Greece was in the middle of a civil war, while Turkey faced pressure over control of strategic territory and access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Britain had previously played the leading role in supporting Greece and Turkey, but after World War II it told the United States it could no longer bear that burden.

Truman responded by asking Congress to approve aid, arguing that the United States had to support “free peoples” resisting outside pressure or armed minority movements. By signing the bill, Truman transformed that broad statement of foreign policy into statutory authority backed by federal money. Legally, the act mattered because it showed how Cold War policy would often be made: the president would identify a global threat, and Congress would authorize funds and tools to respond. It also helped normalize large peacetime commitments abroad, a sharp change from earlier American reluctance to enter long-term foreign entanglements. The statute became an early foundation for the national security state that grew through later aid programs, alliances, intelligence activities, and military commitments.

The Truman Doctrine also raised enduring questions about the balance of power between Congress and the president in foreign affairs. Congress approved the aid, but the broader doctrine gave presidents a flexible language for intervention that could be invoked well beyond Greece and Turkey. In that sense, May 22, 1947, was not just a date in diplomatic history; it was a legal turning point in how the United States authorized, funded, and justified its Cold War role in the world.

A Ninth Circuit panel appeared uncertain about whether Jack Daniel’s proved enough to win its trademark dilution-by-tarnishment claim against VIP Products over the “Bad Spaniels” dog toy. The judges focused especially on whether Jack Daniel’s had shown that anything beyond the words “Jack Daniel’s” was famous enough to qualify for dilution protection. Judge Andrew Hurwitz pressed Jack Daniel’s counsel on whether the company could rely on the fame of its name to protect broader elements of its label and bottle design. Jack Daniel’s argued that the court should consider the full context of the toy, including its bottle-like appearance and bathroom-humor references. VIP, by contrast, argued that the analysis should be limited to the famous mark itself and the allegedly diluting mark, not the entire product presentation.

The case began after VIP made a dog toy parodying a Jack Daniel’s bottle with poop-themed jokes, prompting years of litigation over trademark infringement, dilution, parody, and free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court previously ruled that VIP could not use the Rogers test because the toy used another company’s trademark-like features to identify VIP’s own product. On remand, the district court rejected Jack Daniel’s infringement claim but again found dilution by tarnishment, which VIP appealed. VIP also raised a First Amendment challenge to the federal tarnishment law, though both VIP and the federal government suggested the Ninth Circuit could decide the case without reaching that constitutional issue. The Justice Department intervened to defend the law’s constitutionality while also acknowledging that waiver or insufficient proof could let the panel avoid the First Amendment question.

9th Circ. Questions Jack Daniel’s’ TM Win Over ‘Bad Spaniels’ - Law360

Meta has settled a closely watched lawsuit brought by Breathitt County School District in Kentucky over costs allegedly tied to youth mental health harms from social media. The case was important because it was the first school-district case against social media companies scheduled for trial on these claims. Breathitt had accused Meta, YouTube, Snap, and TikTok of designing platforms that kept young users engaged in harmful ways and contributed to anxiety, depression, self-harm, and other student mental health problems. The district sought more than $60 million, including money for a 15-year mental health program and an order requiring changes to allegedly addictive platform features. Meta’s settlement follows earlier settlements by YouTube, Snap, and TikTok, meaning Breathitt’s case is now fully resolved.

The case was a bellwether, meaning it was chosen as a test case to help courts and parties evaluate similar lawsuits. About 1,200 school districts are pursuing related claims, and thousands of other social-media addiction lawsuits are pending in California state and federal courts. Meta said it resolved the case amicably and pointed to teen-safety tools such as Teen Accounts and parental controls. Lawyers for the school district said they remain focused on claims brought by the other districts. The settlement avoids a June 15 trial that could have shaped settlement talks and strategy across the broader litigation. Other major school systems, including Los Angeles and New York City, have filed similar lawsuits, while DeKalb County, Georgia, has claimed billions in future mental health costs.

Meta settles first US case over school costs tied to youth mental health, court filing shows | Reuters

OpenAI has expanded its group of outside law firms as it faces major litigation, complex business deals, and a possible future IPO. Reuters reports that the company, recently valued at $852 billion, now works with more than a dozen large U.S. law firms. OpenAI, CEO Sam Altman, and lawyers from Wachtell Lipton and Morrison & Foerster recently defeated Elon Musk’s lawsuit claiming that OpenAI had departed from its original nonprofit mission. That ruling removed one potential obstacle to a possible IPO, which sources have said could happen as soon as September. Wachtell has also handled major OpenAI transactions since ChatGPT launched, including large fundraising deals involving Microsoft, Nvidia, and other investors.

Wachtell is a central player for OpenAI in both deal work and litigation. The firm is defending OpenAI in a lawsuit from Musk’s xAI alleging that OpenAI and Apple monopolized markets involving smartphones and generative AI chatbots. In a separate xAI trade secrets case, OpenAI hired Munger, Tolles & Olson. Latham & Watkins has worked on OpenAI deals, including a $4 billion credit line, and is also helping defend the company in copyright lawsuits brought by authors, comedians, and news organizations. OpenAI is arguing in those copyright cases that using material to train AI systems is protected by fair use. Wilson Sonsini is defending OpenAI in a case claiming ChatGPT engaged in unauthorized practice of law, an allegation OpenAI rejects by arguing that ChatGPT is not a lawyer and does not practice law.

OpenAI grows stable of law firms for high-stakes lawsuits, deals | Reuters

This Day in Legal History: First Speed Limit Law

On May 21, 1901, Connecticut became the first U.S. state to pass a law regulating the speed of motor vehicles. The law set a speed limit of 12 miles per hour in cities and 15 miles per hour on country roads. That may sound almost comically slow now, but at the beginning of the twentieth century, the automobile was still a new and disruptive technology. Roads were shared by pedestrians, horses, carriages, bicycles, and early automobiles, often without clear rules about who had priority or how fast anyone could travel. Connecticut’s law reflected a growing legal problem: the common law of negligence could punish dangerous driving after an accident, but legislatures increasingly saw the need to prevent danger before it happened. Speed limits were one of the earliest ways states tried to turn automobile use from a private novelty into a regulated public activity. The law also showed how technological change often forces legal systems to create new categories of public safety regulation.

Before automobiles, road law had developed around animals, wagons, and local travel; cars introduced greater speed, heavier machinery, and new risks of injury. By setting numerical limits, Connecticut moved toward a more modern model of traffic law, where drivers could know in advance what conduct was illegal. This kind of rule also made enforcement easier for police and courts because the question was no longer only whether someone drove “recklessly,” but whether they exceeded a stated limit. Other states and municipalities soon followed with their own automobile rules, licensing systems, registration requirements, and broader traffic codes. The Connecticut statute is a reminder that everyday legal rules often begin as responses to unfamiliar technologies. What started as a modest speed limit helped lay the groundwork for the complex system of motor-vehicle regulation that now shapes daily life on American roads.

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission has sued Minnesota to stop the state from enforcing a new law banning prediction markets. Minnesota became the first state to enact a total ban on platforms such as Kalshi and Polymarket, which let users trade contracts based on the outcome of future events, including sports and elections. Governor Tim Walz signed the law on May 18, 2026, and it is scheduled to take effect on August 1. The CFTC argues that Minnesota’s law conflicts with federal authority because prediction-market contracts are derivatives regulated by the agency under federal law. CFTC Chairman Michael Selig said the law would effectively turn lawful market operators and users into criminals.

Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison said his office is reviewing the lawsuit and raised concerns that prediction markets can be addictive and harmful, especially to young and low-income people. Kalshi and Polymarket both welcomed the federal challenge, arguing that state bans undermine the federal regulatory system and may push users toward offshore platforms. The dispute is part of a broader fight between state gambling regulators and prediction-market companies over whether these products are financial contracts or illegal wagering. The CFTC has also sued other states to block enforcement actions against prediction-market operators. It recently obtained an order stopping Arizona from pursuing a criminal case against Kalshi, while Nevada remains the only state with a court-enforced ban against Kalshi. Massachusetts is also considering whether to uphold an injunction that would block Kalshi from offering sports-event contracts there.

US regulator sues to block Minnesota’s first-in-nation ban on prediction markets | Reuters

Two police officers who defended the U.S. Capitol during the January 6, 2021 attack have sued to stop a nearly $1.8 billion fund created under President Donald Trump’s administration. Former Capitol Police officer Harry Dunn and Metropolitan Police Department officer Daniel Hodges filed the lawsuit in federal court in Washington, D.C. They argue that the fund is an improper use of taxpayer money and could be used to compensate January 6 defendants or groups tied to political violence. The complaint describes the fund as a “slush fund” and seeks a court order blocking any payments from it. The fund was created after Trump settled a lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service over the leak of his tax returns during his first term.

As part of that settlement, the Justice Department established a fund to compensate people who claim they were victims of political “weaponization.” Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche told lawmakers that the fund is not limited to January 6 defendants and could apply to people from any political party. He also said the eligibility standard is broad and tied to claims of having experienced political weaponization. Dunn has publicly described the physical and racist abuse he faced during the Capitol attack, as well as his later struggles with PTSD. Hodges was seriously assaulted during the riot in an incident captured on widely circulated video and has also testified before Congress about his experience.

Police officers who guarded Capitol sue to block Trump’s $1.8 billion ‘slush fund’ | Reuters

Lee Mendelson Film Productions, the company behind A Charlie Brown Christmas, has sued GameMill Entertainment in Manhattan federal court over music used in the video game Snoopy & The Great Mystery Club. The company claims GameMill copied or closely imitated Vince Guaraldi’s well-known Peanuts music without getting the proper license. According to the lawsuit, GameMill had permission to use Peanuts characters in the game but not Guaraldi’s compositions.

The complaint focuses on music that allegedly resembles “Linus and Lucy” and “Skating,” two songs strongly associated with the 1965 holiday special. Mendelson argues that GameMill wanted the emotional and nostalgic effect of the original Peanuts soundtrack while avoiding the cost of licensing it. The lawsuit says the game’s background music is substantially similar to Guaraldi’s work and could make players think they were hearing the actual songs or recordings. A Charlie Brown Christmas remains a major part of American holiday culture, and Guaraldi’s soundtrack has sold millions of copies. GameMill’s game, released in 2025, follows Snoopy as he solves mysteries. The production company is accusing GameMill of copyright infringement and is seeking monetary damages. Neither side had immediately commented on the complaint when the article was published.

‘A Charlie Brown Christmas’ maker sues over music in ‘Snoopy’ video game | Reuters

This Day in Legal History: Homestead Act

On May 20, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Homestead Act into law, creating one of the most consequential land distribution systems in American history. The statute allowed eligible settlers to claim 160 acres of federal land, so long as they lived on it, improved it, and cultivated it for a required period of time. At a basic level, the law treated land ownership as something that could be earned through residence and labor rather than purchased outright. That idea made the act especially powerful for many farmers, immigrants, formerly enslaved people, and poor white settlers who otherwise had limited access to property. But the promise of “free land” was never as simple as it sounded.

Much of the land made available under the Homestead Act had already been occupied, used, or governed by Native nations, and federal land policy often operated alongside removal, broken treaties, and military force. The act therefore expanded private property rights for some while deepening dispossession for others. It also reflected the federal government’s growing role in shaping settlement, agriculture, and economic development across the West. By requiring claimants to improve and farm the land, Congress used property law to encourage a particular vision of citizenship: independent, landowning, agricultural, and tied to national expansion. Over time, the law transferred vast amounts of public land into private hands. By the 1930s, roughly 270 million acres had been distributed under the Homestead Act, about 10% of the land area of the United States. Its legal legacy can be seen in debates over public lands, Indigenous sovereignty, property ownership, and the federal government’s power to define who gets access to opportunity.

Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche told senators that a nearly $1.8 billion “Anti-Weaponization Fund” tied to President Trump’s IRS settlement is “not a slush fund,” but there are several reasons to treat that assurance cautiously. The DOJ says Trump, his sons, and the Trump Organization will accept only a formal apology and no direct damages, while the fund will be available to other people who claim they were victims of government “weaponization” or “lawfare.” The problem is that DOJ has not clearly defined who qualifies, what proof is required, or what would disqualify someone from receiving money. When Sen. Chris Van Hollen asked whether people who assaulted police officers on January 6 could apply, Blanche did not rule it out and instead said anyone could apply if they believed they were a victim. Blanche also said he would not personally write the eligibility rules, though senators noted he will appoint most of the commissioners who will oversee the fund. DOJ’s public announcement says the fund was created as part of Trump’s settlement with the IRS after Trump agreed to drop his lawsuit over the leak of his tax documents.

The comparison to the Obama-era Keepseagle settlement is shaky. Keepseagle involved a discrimination case brought by Native American farmers and was approved by a federal judge, while this fund appears to be created through a settlement involving the sitting president and the IRS, without the same kind of judicial approval described here. Democrats also objected that Obama was not personally a plaintiff in Keepseagle, while Trump is directly connected to this settlement. The most legally significant part may be the addendum saying the IRS is permanently barred from examining certain Trump-related tax matters, including returns filed before the settlement’s effective date. That makes the deal look larger than a privacy settlement over leaked tax documents, because it may also limit future tax enforcement. Even Senate Majority Leader John Thune said there are “a lot of questions” the administration will have to answer, which is a notable sign that concern is not limited to Democrats.

$1.8B IRS Deal Fund ‘Not Slush Fund,’ Blanche Tells Senators - Law360

Workers at another Wells Fargo branch have moved to drop their union, showing that a once-fast-moving labor campaign inside the bank has lost momentum. The Communication Workers of America gave up representing nine employees at a Wilmington, Delaware, branch after one worker sought a vote to decertify the union. That branch had voted unanimously to unionize in early 2024 and was part of a broader organizing push that brought hundreds of Wells Fargo workers at 28 locations into the union. The campaign was notable because union representation is extremely rare in U.S. banking, where less than 1% of workers are unionized. Organizers had focused on complaints about understaffing, flat wages, sales pressure, and the lingering effects of Wells Fargo’s fake-accounts scandal.

The recent Delaware development is the fifth Wells Fargo branch where workers have ousted the union, with other decertifications in Florida, New Jersey, and North Carolina, and another petition pending in Wyoming. Wells Fargo said it supports employees’ right to choose whether they want union representation. The anti-union National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, which has helped workers challenge union representation, framed the decertifications as evidence that employees are rejecting CWA involvement. The CWA, for its part, has blamed Wells Fargo for slowing contract talks and has accused the bank of retaliating against union supporters and cutting benefits at unionized branches. Wells Fargo denies wrongdoing and says delays are tied partly to the difficulty of negotiating some of the first union contracts in retail banking. The broader context is also unfavorable for unions, with fewer union elections held in 2025 than in 2024 and labor advocates arguing that changes at the National Labor Relations Board under President Trump have made organizing harder.

Wells Fargo workers nix another union as tide turns in novel labor campaign | Reuters

Anthropic is challenging the Defense Department’s decision to label it a supply chain risk and bar it from government contracting, arguing that the move was an extreme response to a contract dispute over how its Claude AI models could be used. The dispute began during negotiations over the department’s GenAI.mil platform, where the government wanted contract terms allowing all lawful uses of Claude, while Anthropic sought exceptions for mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapons systems. Anthropic argued that the department’s main theory was wrong because once Claude was deployed on the department’s classified network, it would be air-gapped and Anthropic could not secretly interfere with it during a military operation. The company also said the government had less drastic options, such as declining to buy future Claude models, instead of using a blacklisting authority that had apparently never been used this way before. One D.C. Circuit judge seemed strongly skeptical of the government’s action, calling the supply-chain-risk designation a major overreach. Other judges were less certain, asking whether the opaque and unpredictable nature of AI models could justify the government’s concern that hidden limits might affect military uses.

The government argued that Anthropic’s own proposed red lines created a real operational risk, especially if the company expected officials to seek real-time exceptions during military activity. But the judges also pressed the government on why it needed such broad freedom to use AI, including for fully autonomous weapons, given known concerns about AI reliability. They also questioned why the department went straight to a supply-chain-risk designation instead of simply ending or narrowing the relationship. Anthropic said the government skipped required procedural steps, including a joint recommendation and a 30-day response period, before issuing the designation. The government claimed it had to act quickly because Claude was already being used on several Defense Department platforms. Anthropic countered that this urgency argument was weakened by the department’s decision to phase out Claude over six months rather than immediately remove it.

Anthropic Says Defense Dept. Smeared It Over AI Red Lines - Law360

A Massachusetts judge refused to let Morgan & Morgan lawyer T. Michael Morgan appear in civil litigation against Harvard Medical School over the theft and sale of body parts from donated cadavers. The judge said Morgan’s earlier sanction in a Wyoming case, where court filings included fake AI-generated case citations, showed a failure to meet basic ethical duties. Morgan had disclosed the prior sanction when asking to appear as an out-of-state lawyer in the Harvard case, but the judge said he did not explain enough about how he had changed his practices to prevent the same problem from happening again. The judge also criticized Morgan for procedural problems with the Massachusetts application, including not having local counsel submit it and paying the wrong fee.

Morgan & Morgan said Morgan had accepted responsibility for the earlier mistake and that the firm had added safeguards around AI use. The underlying Harvard litigation involves families who say Harvard mishandled donated bodies after its former morgue manager, Cedric Lodge, stole and sold body parts; Harvard has condemned Lodge’s actions but denies civil liability. Lodge was sentenced to eight years in prison in December. The ruling adds to a growing line of cases where lawyers have been sanctioned or warned for relying on AI tools without verifying the accuracy of legal citations.

Lawyer barred from Harvard morgue scandal case over fake AI citations | Reuters

This Day in Legal History: 27th Amendment

On May 19, 1992, the 27th Amendment to the United States Constitution was officially published in the Federal Register, ending one of the longest and oddest ratification stories in American legal history. The amendment provides that any law changing the compensation of members of Congress cannot take effect until after an election for the House of Representatives has taken place. Put more simply, Congress may vote to change its own pay, but it cannot make that change immediate. The rule gives voters a chance to respond before the pay change takes effect.

What makes the 27th Amendment unusual is not only what it says, but how long it took to become law. It was originally proposed by James Madison in 1789 as part of the same set of amendments that produced the Bill of Rights. Most of those amendments were ratified quickly, but this one lingered for more than two centuries. Because Congress had not set a ratification deadline, the amendment remained legally available for state approval. In the 1980s, a renewed ratification campaign helped bring it back to public attention. Michigan became the 38th state to ratify it in May 1992, giving it the three-fourths approval required by Article V of the Constitution.

The amendment’s publication in the Federal Register on May 19 marked the formal public recognition that it had become part of the Constitution. Its ratification raised a serious legal question about whether an amendment proposed in the 18th century could still be valid in the 20th century. The answer, at least for amendments without a deadline, was yes. The 27th Amendment stands as a reminder that constitutional change can move slowly, sometimes across generations, and still become binding law.

The Supreme Court agreed to hear a case about whether Title IX’s protections against sex discrimination in federally funded education programs extend to employees, including college professors and coaches. The case was brought by former Augusta University professor Thomas Crowther and former Georgia Tech women’s basketball coach MaChelle Joseph, both of whom lost their jobs after workplace-conduct investigations. Crowther claimed Augusta University retaliated against him and discriminated against him based on sex after it suspended him and declined to renew his contract. Joseph argued that Georgia Tech fired her in retaliation for her complaints about unequal treatment of women’s athletics and female athletes. Their cases reached the Eleventh Circuit together, where the court ruled that Title IX clearly protects students, but that its application to employees is less certain. That ruling placed the Eleventh Circuit on one side of a broader circuit split.

The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have taken a narrower view of Title IX employment claims, while the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have allowed employees to bring certain Title IX claims. The solicitor general agreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s narrower reading but urged the Supreme Court to take the case because lower courts are divided. The case gives the justices a chance to decide whether professors, coaches, and other school employees can use Title IX directly to sue for workplace sex discrimination or retaliation.

High Court To Examine Title IX Protections For Coaches, Profs - Law360

A New York state judge partially granted Luigi Mangione’s request to keep certain evidence out of his upcoming murder trial. Mangione is accused of killing UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson outside a Manhattan hotel in December 2024 and has pleaded not guilty. Justice Gregory Carro ruled that police unlawfully searched Mangione’s backpack during his arrest in Pennsylvania without a warrant. Because of that, some items found during the first search, including a loaded handgun magazine, a cellphone, and a computer chip, will be suppressed. But the judge allowed other evidence from a later police-station search of the backpack, including a gun, silencer, USB drive, and red notebook.

Carro also rejected Mangione’s effort to suppress his initial statements to police, finding that they were not obtained through an illegal interrogation. The ruling gives the defense a partial win, but prosecutors say they still have substantial evidence tying Mangione to the shooting, including DNA, fingerprints, video footage, and other items. Mangione’s state trial is scheduled to begin on September 8 and is expected to last about six weeks. He also faces separate federal charges, though earlier rulings in that case removed the possibility of the death penalty.

Judge grants accused CEO killer Mangione’s bid to suppress evidence due to unlawful search | Reuters

State lawmakers have rejected dozens of anti-vaccine bills backed by Make America Healthy Again supporters, showing limits to the movement’s influence in state legislatures. The bills sought to roll back or end policies such as school vaccination requirements, but public health groups and medical associations mounted successful opposition campaigns. Groups including American Families for Vaccines and the American Academy of Pediatrics argued that vaccine mandates remain broadly supported and are important for public health. Their strategy focused especially on Republican-controlled states, where advocates used polling and personal appeals to persuade lawmakers that opposing vaccines could be both medically risky and politically unpopular. Anti-vaccine proposals increased this year because MAHA-aligned groups coordinated efforts across multiple states. Still, bills failed in places including Idaho, West Virginia, Tennessee, South Dakota, Florida, and Iowa. The debate is unfolding as Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a longtime vaccine skeptic, has taken steps against mandatory immunization policies, though some changes have been paused in litigation. Both sides expect the issue to continue, with anti-vaccine advocates encouraged by hearings and organizing momentum, while public health advocates say more legislation is likely to appear in future sessions.

US states reject anti-vaccine bills as public health groups fight MAHA | Reuters

My column for Bloomberg this week argues that a federal gas tax holiday would be a poor answer to rising gas prices because it would do little for household affordability while further weakening transportation funding. Gas prices are being driven by forces Congress cannot easily fix by statute, including conflict involving Iran and instability around the Strait of Hormuz.

Lawmakers are nevertheless showing bipartisan interest in suspending the federal gas tax, including President Donald Trump, Sen. Josh Hawley, and House Speaker Mike Johnson. The political appeal is clear because gas prices are highly visible and give lawmakers a simple way to say they are responding to voters’ economic pain. But the federal gas tax has been frozen at 18.4 cents per gallon since 1993, even as infrastructure costs have continued to rise. Suspending it would take revenue away from the Highway Trust Fund, which helps pay for highways, roads, bridges, and mass transit.

The column argues that Congress should separate the problem of household hardship from the problem of transportation finance. Instead of cutting the gas tax, lawmakers could provide targeted help through refundable credits, direct payments, commuter assistance, or flexible transportation support for low- and moderate-income households.

If Congress insists on a gas tax holiday, it should at least pair it with an immediate dedicated backfill and longer-term reforms such as indexing the gas tax to inflation, adopting mileage-based fees, or modernizing road-use charges. The larger point is that high gas prices are real, but a gas tax holiday is a badly targeted discount financed by a transportation system that is already financially strained.