This Day in Legal History: United States v. Cruikshank
On March 27, 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Cruikshank, a ruling that exposed the Court’s deep reluctance to enforce the promises of Reconstruction. The case arose from the Colfax Massacre, where dozens of Black citizens were murdered by white supremacists attempting to overturn a contested election. Federal prosecutors secured convictions under the Enforcement Act, aiming to protect Black citizens’ constitutional rights in the face of organized racial violence. The Supreme Court, however, dismantled those convictions with striking indifference to the underlying atrocities.
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment constrained only state action, not the conduct of private individuals, effectively shielding perpetrators of racial terror from federal accountability. It further ruled that rights such as assembly and bearing arms were not protected from state interference through the Constitution at that time. This narrow interpretation gutted federal enforcement power at precisely the moment it was most needed. The decision ignored the reality that state authorities in the South were often unwilling—or actively refusing—to protect Black citizens.
Critically, the Court’s reasoning elevated formal legal distinctions over the lived experience of widespread, systematic violence. By insisting on a rigid state-action requirement, the justices created a legal loophole large enough to permit organized terror campaigns to flourish unchecked. The ruling signaled to white supremacist groups that federal intervention would be weak or nonexistent. In doing so, it contributed directly to the collapse of Reconstruction-era protections and the rise of Jim Crow.
The long-term consequences were profound, as Cruikshank became a cornerstone for limiting civil rights enforcement for decades. It delayed meaningful federal protection of individual rights until well into the twentieth century. Modern constitutional law has largely rejected its reasoning through incorporation doctrine, yet its impact remains a stark reminder of how judicial decisions can entrench injustice.
A federal judge in California issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Trump administration from labeling Anthropica national security supply chain risk, finding the move was likely unconstitutional retaliation. The dispute arose after Anthropic pushed back during contract negotiations with the government, arguing it should be allowed to limit how its AI system Claude is used, particularly for mass domestic surveillance and autonomous weapons. Shortly after the company made its position public, the administration directed agencies to stop using its tools and moved to formally designate it as a security risk.
Judge Rita F. Lin concluded that Anthropic is likely to succeed on its claims, emphasizing that the government appeared to be punishing the company for publicly criticizing its contracting stance. She found that the measures were not closely tied to genuine national security concerns and instead resembled retaliation for protected speech. The court stressed that while the government is free to choose its vendors, it cannot take additional punitive steps that violate constitutional protections.
The ruling also found that the designation was likely unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and potentially violated due process because Anthropic had no opportunity to respond. The judge noted that branding a company as a national security threat for expressing disagreement raises serious constitutional concerns. The injunction blocks enforcement of the directive and prevents further action against the company while the case proceeds.
The decision highlights broader tensions between government control over AI use and private companies’ efforts to impose ethical limits. It also underscores concerns that government retaliation could chill public debate about AI safety. The administration must now report back to the court on its compliance with the order.
Anthropic Blocks Pentagon’s ‘Orwellian’ Security Risk Label - Law360
US judge blocks Pentagon’s Anthropic blacklisting for now | Reuters
A lawyer for Elon Musk has asked a federal judge to review a jury verdict that found him liable for defrauding Twitter investors during his acquisition of the platform, now known as X. The request focuses in part on the jury’s use of the number “$4.20” on the verdict form, which Musk’s attorney argued was an intentional joke that showed bias and suggested the jury was trying to “send a message” rather than decide the case impartially.
Musk’s legal team claims this, along with other alleged trial issues, undermines the integrity of the verdict and warrants further judicial review by Judge Charles Breyer. The verdict, issued on March 20, found Musk liable for certain public statements he made about the prevalence of bots on the platform during the acquisition process, which investors argued harmed the company’s stock price. Potential damages in the case could reach as high as $2.5 billion.
Attorneys for the investors strongly rejected Musk’s arguments, calling them baseless and accusing him of attacking the jury instead of accepting responsibility. They emphasized that the verdict followed substantial evidence presented at trial.
The dispute stems from claims that Musk publicly criticized Twitter to renegotiate or exit the deal, ultimately affecting shareholders who sold at lower prices. While the jury found him liable for some statements, it did not conclude that he engaged in a broader scheme to defraud.
Musk urges judge to review Twitter verdict, accuses jury of ‘mocking’ him | Reuters
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived part of an ERISA class action against Wells Fargo and Ocwen Financial Corp., overturning a lower court decision that had dismissed the case before trial. The lawsuit was brought by trustees of a union pension fund, who claim the companies mishandled subprime mortgages tied to the fund’s investments in mortgage-backed securities.
The appellate court found that the trial judge made a key mistake in concluding that none of the underlying mortgages qualified as ERISA plan assets. While the court agreed that some mortgage-backed securities—specifically those structured as notes—are not plan assets, it ruled differently for securities issued as trust certificates. In those instances, the underlying mortgages can count as plan assets because the investment structure gives the pension fund an equity-like interest in the trust.
This distinction matters because ERISA fiduciary duties apply only to plan assets. By recognizing that certain underlying mortgages fall within that definition, the court reopened the possibility that the companies could be held liable for breaching fiduciary duties. The pension fund alleges that the defendants mishandled loans during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, including pushing borrowers into foreclosure, which harmed the fund’s investments.
The court declined to decide whether Ocwen acted as an ERISA fiduciary, noting that the lower court had not addressed that issue. As a result, the case will return to the trial court for further proceedings on the revived claims.
2nd Circ. Reopens Mortgage-Backed Securities ERISA Suit - Law360
